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TOO CLOSE TO HOME: LIMITING THE ORGANIZATIONS 
SUBSIDIZED BY THE CHARITABLE DEDUCTION TO THOSE IN 
ECONOMIC NEED  
Shannon Weeks McCormack
*
 
The charitable deduction allows taxpayers to deduct amounts donated to 
organizations pursuing statutorily designated purposes from their otherwise taxable 
income. By lowering the after-tax cost of giving and encouraging taxpayers to donate 
more than they otherwise would, the charitable deduction subsidizes a broad variety of 
organizations. Some of these organizations provide widespread societal benefits, while 
others provide narrower benefits that remain closer to the taxpayer-donor’s home. To 
evaluate these current laws, this Article focuses on efficiency criteria, which limit 
subsidized organizations to those with donor support that does not cover the costs needed 
to optimally provide goods and services. Existing scholarship has identified the 
conditions that cause these underfunding issues but has not sought to apply these 
concepts to determine whether the organizations subsidized through the charitable 
deduction are actually in economic need. This Article seeks to fill this gap. While one 
cannot precisely determine whether and to what extent any given organization or type of 
organization is underfunded, the general assessment of this Article provides a starting 
point for evaluating the scope of the deduction. This Article suggests that some 
organizations currently subsidized through the charitable deduction may be able to 
garner sufficient donations on their own and that the tax law may provide subsidies that 
are economically unnecessary.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On a normal morning, a regular mom might take her daughter to her 
neighborhood school. Walking inside, she may make small talk with other 
parents and plan ―play dates‖ and ―car pools‖ for the week. Later, she may 
pick up her daughter and stroll to the nearby park where she sees the 
familiar faces of other parents and children with the same routine. Maybe 
on her way home she chooses a different route that passes her family‘s 
church. Through the beautiful stained glass windows, she hears the sound 
of the pastor‘s voice—a voice she also hears every Sunday at the services 
she attends with her family. She feels grateful for all of these places that 
play an important role in her life and in the lives of her family, friends, and 
neighbors. In fact, she makes it a point to donate to each of these 
organizations—her daughter‘s school, her church, and the fund for 
neighborhood park upkeep—just like many other members of her 
community. She also makes it a point to deduct these contributed amounts 
from her taxable income each year, which the tax law fully allows.
1
  
                                                                                                                     
 1. Individuals may deduct amounts that they contribute to organizations formed for certain 
purposes such as those ―organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, 
scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports 
competition . . . or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals.‖ I.R.C. § 170(a)(1), 
(c)(2)(B) (West 2010). The regulations explicate on the meaning of charitable as follows:  
The term charitable[,] . . . in its generally accepted legal sense, . . . includes: 
[r]elief of the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged; advancement of 
2
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Today, the charitable deduction is a veritable mainstay of the tax law.
2
 
Individuals may deduct amounts contributed to organizations formed for a 
variety of broad, statutorily designated purposes, such as religious, 
charitable, or educational purposes.
3
 Thus, one may deduct amounts 
contributed to organizations which provide food to the needy, which seek 
to educate underprivileged children throughout the nation or around the 
globe, and which attempt to eradicate decay in underprivileged 
neighborhoods.
4
 A taxpayer may also deduct amounts contributed to her 
child‘s school,5 to the local parent teacher association serving that school,6 
to the church where she regularly attends services and events,
7
 to her 
child‘s local sports team,8 to local boy or girl scouts troops,9 and to 
organizations that maintain or improve parks in her neighborhood.
10
 In this 
way, the tax law allows deductions for amounts contributed to 
organizations that provide far-reaching benefits and to those that provide 
benefits remaining rather close to the taxpayer‘s home. This Article uses 
efficiency criteria to evaluate these current laws and argues that allowing 
deductions in many of the latter situations may result in economically 
                                                                                                                     
religion; advancement of education or science; erection or maintenance of public 
buildings, monuments, or works; lessening of the burdens of 
Government; . . . [lessening] neighborhood tensions; [eliminating] prejudice and 
discrimination; [defending] human and civil rights secured by law; [and 
combating] community deterioration and juvenile delinquency.  
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(2) (as amended in 2008); see also Search for Charities, Online 
Version of Publication 78, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/app/pub-78/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2011) 
(providing ―a [searchable] list of organizations eligible to receive tax-deductible charitable 
contributions‖). 
 2. The charitable deduction has been a part of the Tax Code for almost a century. See 
Chauncey Belknap, The Federal Income Tax Exemption of Charitable Organizations: Its History 
and Underlying Policy, in 4 RESEARCH PAPERS SPONSORED BY THE COMMISSION ON PRIVATE 
PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS 2025, 2026 (Dep‘t of the Treas. 1977) (providing a historical 
overview of the charitable contribution deduction); see also CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, FEDERAL TAX 
POLICY AND CHARITABLE GIVING 11 (1985) (stating that government enacted the deduction for 
individual contributions to eligible organizations in 1917). See generally Ellen P. Aprill, Churches, 
Politics, and the Charitable Contribution Deduction, 42 B.C. L. REV. 843, 848–56 (2001) 
(discussing the legislative history of § 170); Vada Waters Lindsey, The Charitable Contribution 
Deduction: A Historical Review and a Look to the Future, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1056, 1061–70 (2003) 
(discussing the legislative history of § 170). 
 3. I.R.C. § 170(a)(1), (c)(2)(B).  
 4. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(2) (as amended in 2008).  
 5. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B). 
 6. Search for Charities, Online Version of Publication 78, supra note 1 (search ―parent 
teacher‖).  
 7. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B). 
 8. Search for Charities, Online Version of Publication 78, supra note 1 (search, for 
example, ―baseball‖).   
 9. Id. (search ―boy scouts‖). 
 10. Id. (search, for example, ―playground‖).  
3
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unnecessary subsidies. 
Part II introduces the basic principles of the charitable deduction, 
which increases the ability of qualifying organizations to raise capital by 
lowering the cost of giving.
11
 Thus, the deduction acts as a mechanism to 
subsidize organizations
12
 that citizen-taxpayers select when they donate 
money or property.
13
 Viewed this way, in order to properly limit the 
charitable deduction, it is critical to determine the sorts of organizations 
the government should subsidize.
14
  
Part III summarizes the predominant theories used to justify the 
charitable deduction. While each theory provides important reasons for 
having some form of charitable deduction, none provides economic 
limitations on the deduction‘s scope. Part III suggests that efficiency 
criteria can serve this important limiting role by granting the deduction 
only when needed to ensure that goods and services are optimally funded.
15
 
Application of these criteria would therefore prevent organizations from 
receiving subsidies when underfunding is not an issue.  
To apply this ―underfunding requirement,‖ Part IV first develops the 
―optimal subsidization model‖ to determine when goods and services are 
optimally provided (i.e., not underfunded) and the ―rational donor model‖ 
to determine whether and to what extent a ―rational‖ donor will contribute 
to a particular donee-organization. Using these models, donee-
organizations should not be underfunded when those directly benefitting 
from the goods and services provided are both economically rational and 
financially capable of contributing. Thus, the charitable deduction is 
                                                                                                                     
 11. See infra Part II.   
 12. Exactly how much depends on the ―elasticity‖ of the deduction—that is, how much giving 
increases in relation to the tax savings provided by the deduction. See CLOTFELTER, supra note 2, at 
49–63 (summarizing studies and concluding that they suggest the price elasticity of charitable 
giving is at least one); Aprill, supra note 2, at 856–59 (explaining that changes in the after tax cost 
of making a charitable contribution are reflected in price elasticity); Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a 
Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 1393, 1396–1406 (1988) (specifying how price 
elasticity might ensure that the benefits of a deduction outweigh its costs); Peter J. Wiedenbeck, 
Charitable Contributions: A Policy Perspective, 50 MO. L. REV. 85, 92 n.34 (1985) (suggesting that 
estimates of income and price elasticities indicate that the net effect on charitable giving of an 
overall tax rate reduction would be a substantial reduction in contributions).  
 13. Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 405 (1998) (―[E]ach individual 
taxpayer‘s choice, deduction, or ‗ballot,‘ not only reflects a private contribution but also triggers a 
matching government contribution in the form of a reimbursement of part of the taxpayer-donor‘s 
gift.‖); see also, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions or Matching 
Grants?, 28 TAX L. REV. 37, 45 (1972) (discussing how the charitable deduction preserves a ―large 
degree of institutional and donor independence‖). 
 14. That is, the deduction should be provided only in the same instances in which other direct 
subsidies would be justified. See, e.g., Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for 
Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. 
L. REV. 705, 726 (1970) (―[W]hatever degree of scrutiny and care should be applied to direct 
expenditures should also be applied to tax incentives.‖).  
 15. See infra Part III.  
4
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economically unnecessary in those cases.  
However, as also explored in Part IV, underfunding may occur for 
various reasons. For instance, collective action problems
 
may prevent 
direct beneficiaries from ―rationally‖ contributing because these 
individuals assume they can benefit from others‘ contributions.16 Further, 
when donors fail to internalize the benefits of others, such as when donee-
organizations provide benefits to unknown recipients, externality problems 
may result in sub-optimal distribution of goods and services.
17
 Allowing 
donors to deduct amounts contributed to organizations suffering from these 
problems encourages them to donate more than they otherwise would. By 
limiting the deduction to such circumstances, the underfunding 
requirement would provide subsidies only to organizations unable to garner 
sufficient donations on their own.  
Although the underfunding requirement is an important limiting 
principle, existing scholarship has not sought to apply it to determine 
whether the organizations subsidized by the charitable deduction are 
actually in economic need. Part V seeks to fill this gap. While one cannot 
precisely determine whether and to what extent any given organization or 
type of organization will suffer from underfunding problems, the general 
assessment provided by this Part offers a starting point for evaluating the 
current scope of the deduction. This Part considers four hypothetical 
donations, all of which are generally entitled to the charitable deduction 
under current law: donations to an organization that provides toys to 
children in a remote village,
18
 donations to an organization that funds opera 
productions,
19
 donations made to a specific church used to fund religious 
activities (including those made by individuals regularly attending its 
services and events)
20
 and donations made to a specific school (including 
those made by parents of its students).
21
 The analysis suggests that these 
hypothetical donee-organizations suffer a great range of underfunding 
problems and that the latter two organizations may experience these issues 
only minimally. Thus, it becomes rather difficult to use efficiency concepts 
to justify the charitable deduction in these and similar scenarios.  
Part VI concludes with a summary of this analysis and an explanation 
of how it can be of general use. In addition to scrutinizing specific cases, 
the analysis provides a useful starting point for applying the underfunding 
requirement in other contexts. It reveals that underfunding may not be 
                                                                                                                     
 16. See infra Part IV.B. 
 17. See infra Part IV.C. 
 18. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (as amended in 2008) (defining charitable to 
include ―[r]elief of the poor‖). 
 19. See Search for Charities, Online Version of Publication 78, supra note 1 (search 
―opera‖). 
 20. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(i) (West 2010); see also infra note 129 (recognizing that 
churches may also fund other charitable activities).  
 21. See § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii). 
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severe when donors both enjoy significant benefits from their donations 
and share ongoing relationships with other beneficiaries. By allowing 
donors to deduct amounts contributed to organizations that provide 
benefits remaining ―too close to home,‖ the tax law provides subsidies that 
may be economically unnecessary. Part VI also offers preliminary thoughts 
on how to respond to these exposed issues.  
II.  BACKGROUND MATERIAL: THE CHARITABLE DEDUCTION AS AN 
ORGANIZATIONAL SUBSIDY 
Individuals may deduct amounts that qualify as ―charitable 
contributions‖ under § 170 of the Internal Revenue Code.22 Section 170(c) 
defines ―charitable contribution‖ by reference to the ultimate recipient 
organization, providing, for instance, that a taxpayer may deduct amounts 
contributed to organizations ―organized and operated exclusively for 
religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or to 
foster national or international amateur sports competition . . . or for the 
prevention of cruelty to children or animals.‖23 Section 170(c) mirrors 
§ 501(c)(3), which exempts these organizations from federal income 
taxation because they ―provide what is seen as significant community or 
public benefit (rather than just a benefit to its members or its political 
constituents).‖24 
Some tax deductions are used to accurately measure income. For 
instance, because the U.S. tax system seeks to tax net profits as opposed to 
gross earnings, taxpayers may deduct the costs related to their income-
producing activities in order to properly calculate their taxable income.25 
Many other deductions, however, are not needed in this way but are instead 
meant to create behavioral incentives or achieve societal goals. Such 
provisions, which are referred to as ―tax expenditures,‖ have been 
described by Professor Stanley Surrey as follows:  
The term ―tax expenditure‖ has been used to describe 
those special  provisions of the federal income tax system 
which represent government  expenditures made through that 
system to achieve various social  and economic objectives. 
These special provisions provide  deductions, credits, exclusions, 
exemptions, deferrals, and  preferential rates, and serve ends 
                                                                                                                     
 22. See § 170(a)(1), (c). 
 23. § 170(c)(2)(B). These ―community benefit‖ organizations will be the focus of this Article. 
There are, however, other organizations able to receive deductible contributions. For instance, a 
taxpayer may deduct amounts contributed to ―[a] post or organization of war veterans,‖ or to ―[a] 
cemetery company owned and operated exclusively for the benefit of its members, or any 
corporation chartered solely for burial purposes as a cemetery corporation and not permitted by its 
charter to engage in any business not necessarily incident to that purpose . . . .‖ I.R.C. § 170(c)(3), 
(5).  
 24. Evelyn A. Lewis, Charitable Waste: Consideration of a “Waste Not, Want Not” Tax, 30 
VA. TAX. REV. 39, 47 n.27 (2010); see also I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).  
 25. See I.R.C. §§ 162(a), 212 (West 2010).  
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similar in nature to those served by direct government 
expenditures or loan programs.
26
  
While several notable scholars have argued that the charitable 
deduction is a necessary adjustment to the income tax base,
27
 it is more 
commonly categorized as a tax expenditure provision.
28
 By lowering the 
after-tax cost of giving, the charitable deduction encourages taxpayers to 
give to organizations pursuing the statutorily designated purposes.
29
 
                                                                                                                     
 26. See Surrey, supra note 14, at 706.  
 27. Professor William D. Andrews provides one of the most robust defenses of the charitable 
deduction as a necessary adjustment to the income tax base. William D. Andrews, Personal 
Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309 (1972). Andrews first defines ―an ideal 
personal income tax [as] one in which tax burdens are accurately apportioned to a taxpayer‘s 
aggregate personal consumption and accumulation of real goods and services . . . .‖ Id. at 313. 
According to Andrews, expenditures should be deductible as a needed adjustment to this tax base 
unless they are used for personal consumption or to accumulate savings. Id. Professor Andrews 
defines consumptive expenses as those incurred in exchange for preclusive goods, defined as 
―divisible, private goods and services whose consumption by one household precludes enjoyment 
by others, but not collective goods whose enjoyment is nonpreclusive.‖ Id. at 314–15. Andrews 
therefore concludes that the charitable deduction is a necessary adjustment to the income tax base 
because qualifying donations fund goods that can be enjoyed by individuals other than (though 
sometimes including) the donor and members of his household. Id. For vigorous commentary 
disagreeing with Andrews‘s formulation, see, for example, Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions 
Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an “Ideal” Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far from 
Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831, 838 (1979); Paul R. McDaniel, Federal Matching Grants for 
Charitable Contributions: A Substitute for the Income Tax Deduction, 27 TAX L. REV. 377, 378 
(1972); Stanley S. Surrey, Federal Tax Reform: The Varied Approaches Necessary to Replace Tax 
Expenditures with Direct Governmental Assistance, 84 HARV. L. REV. 352, 381–94 (1970).  
 28. The remainder of this Article will assume this to be the case. See John D. Colombo, The 
Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable Contributions Deduction: Integrating Theories for 
the Deduction and Tax Exemption, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 657, 682 (2001) (―Despite suggestions 
that the section 170 deduction can be explained as an incentive for individual altruism and despite 
Professor Andrews‘ suggestion that the deduction is consistent with the normative definition of the 
income tax base [discussed in this Article], the most widely accepted rationale for the section 170 
deduction remains that the deduction helps subsidize the activities of charitable organizations.‖). 
According to Professor Peter J. Wiedenbeck, ―The better view is that the charitable deduction is not 
a proper allowance in measuring disposable income.‖ Wiedenbeck, supra note 12, at 91; see also 
Harold H. Hochman & James D. Rodgers, The Optimal Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions, 
30 NAT‘L. TAX J. 1 (1977), reprinted in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS 224, 228 
(Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986) (―Implicit in the subsidy to charity is a price reduction, which 
induces those in the first group, who contribute even without subsidy, to increase their nominal 
contributions, so long as their demands are at all elastic. The price reduction causes a second 
group . . . [of] noncontributors, to make some voluntary contributions.‖); C. Eugene Steuerle & 
Martin A. Sullivan, Toward More Simple and Effective Giving: Reforming the Tax Rules for 
Charitable Contributions and Charitable Organizations, 12 AM. J. TAX POL‘Y 399, 403–04 (1995) 
(explaining that charitable deductions operate as an incentive to giving and thus a subsidy to 
socially desirable organizations); Wiedenbeck, supra note 12, at 94–95 (―The charitable 
contribution deduction is a tax expenditure (an indirect subsidy) . . . because it is a substitute for 
taxing contributors and making up for the reduction in private giving by direct budget outlays.‖).  
 29. This is reflected in the legislative history of the charitable deduction. The government 
enacted the charitable deduction in the War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, 40 Stat. 300, 301, 330, in 
7
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Therefore, the deduction is generally viewed as an organizational 
subsidy
30
—that is, a subsidy to the donee-organization that receives the 
deductible contribution. 
To illustrate, suppose Arnie Altruist donated $100 to his favorite 
charity, entitling him to deduct his contribution under the tax laws. If 
Arnie‘s applicable tax rate is 30%, the charitable deduction would provide 
him $30 in value because it would reduce his otherwise taxable income by 
that amount. In effect, Arnie pays $70 to his favorite charity and the 
government subsidizes the remaining $30. Thus, the purpose
31
 and 
economic effect of the deduction
32
 is to subsidize the donee-organization. 
Rather than subsidizing organizations in this manner, the government 
could provide grants directly
33
 by ―matching‖ a portion of contributed 
                                                                                                                     
which tax rates dramatically increased from 7% to 50% in order to fund the United States‘ efforts in 
World War I. See Wiedenbeck, supra note 12, at 93 n.35. Senator Henry Hollis stated:  
It will work in this way: Usually people contribute to charities and educational 
objects out of their surplus. After they have done everything else they want to do, 
after they have educated their children and traveled and spent their money on 
everything they really want or think they want, then, if they have something left 
over, they will contribute it to a college or to the Red Cross or for some scientific 
purposes. Now, when war comes and we impose these very heavy taxes on 
incomes, that will be the first place where the wealthy men will be tempted to 
economize, namely, in donations to charity. They will say, ―Charity begins at 
home.‖  
Id. (quoting 55 CONG. REC. S6728 (1917)). 
Due to concern that the increased tax burden would diminish people‘s willingness (and perhaps 
ability) to make charitable donations, the deduction was granted. Id. at 92–93. For an overview of 
the history of the charitable deduction, see Aprill, supra note 2, at 848–56; Lindsey, supra note 2, at 
1061–70. See also generally John A. Wallace & Robert W. Fisher, The Charitable Deduction 
Under Section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code (1975), reprinted in 4 RESEARCH PAPERS 
SPONSORED BY THE COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS 2131 (Dep‘t of the 
Treas. 1977) (providing an analysis of § 170 with an ―emphasis . . . [on] expressed Congressional 
intent and purpose, as well as historical development‖).  
 30. See, e.g., Colombo, supra note 28, at 661 (―[T]he section 170 deduction is best explained 
as an indirect government subsidy to charitable organizations and, hence, the definition of a 
deductible economic transfer under section 170 should relate to the underlying goals of tax 
exemption.‖). Professor John D. Colombo views the deduction as ―an auxiliary subsidy for exempt 
organizations rather than as a stand-alone provision with a separate theoretical basis.‖ Id. at 662. He 
further notes that ―existing literature surrounding the Section 170 deduction generally accepts the 
subsidization role of the deduction.‖ Id. at 661.  
 31. See Wiedenbeck, supra note 12, at 93 n.35 (statement of Sen. Hollis).  
 32. The extent to which the charitable deduction subsidizes organizations depends on price 
elasticity. See supra note 12 (summarizing literature on the topic).  
 33. For any provided tax incentive, a program of direct governmental expenditures can be 
constructed which would have the same economic effect. See Surrey, supra note 14, at 706. In the 
above example, the taxpayer was able to deduct 30% of his donation. There are indeed many other 
types of direct expenditure programs such as ―loans, interest subsidies, guarantees of loan 
repayment or interest payments, [and] insurance on investments . . . .‖ Id. at 713. According to 
Dean Saul Levmore:  
8
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amounts.
34
 For instance, rather than receiving a charitable deduction, Arnie 
could donate $70 to his favorite charity, and the government could provide 
the remaining $30 directly to the donee-organization. Thus, to define the 
proper scope of the charitable deduction, it is important to focus upon the 
attributes of donee-organizations and determine which organizations 
should receive governmental funding.
35
  
III.  NON-ECONOMIC THEORIES JUSTIFYING THE CHARITABLE DEDUCTION 
AND THE ROLE OF EFFICIENCY CRITERIA IN DEFINING ITS SCOPE 
One might reasonably ask: Why should the tax law offer a charitable 
deduction at all? This Part briefly summarizes the predominant non-
economic theories that justify the deduction.
36
 This Part shows that these 
theories do not provide economic limitations on the scope of the deduction 
and suggests that efficiency criteria can play an important role in limiting 
the organizations subsidized by the charitable deduction to those in 
economic need.  
A.  Public Benefit Theory  
One justification for the charitable deduction is that subsidized donee-
organizations provide ―something in the nature of common or social goods 
or services.‖37 In some cases, these organizations provide goods or services 
                                                                                                                     
The charitable deduction makes the government a partner in every gift-giving 
venture; a taxpayer in the (hypothetical but arithmetically convenient) 50 percent 
bracket, for instance, can be seen as joining forces with the government to give 
equal amounts to the cause chosen by the taxpayer (with characteristics or 
minimum qualifications set by the government). Hence each individual taxpayer‘s 
choice, deduction, or ―ballot,‖ not only reflects a private contribution but also 
triggers a matching government contribution in the form of a reimbursement of 
part of the taxpayer-donor‘s gift.  
Levmore, supra note 13, at 405. 
 34. See Bittker, supra note 13, at 39–46 (discussing the propriety of the substitution of 
matching grants for the charitable deduction).  
 35. See Surrey, supra note 14, at 726 (―[W]hatever degree of scrutiny and care should be 
applied to direct expenditures should also be applied to tax incentives.‖).  
 36. Colombo, supra note 28, at 659 (―The major legal articles fall into two distinct camps: 
those that would abolish the deduction altogether, perhaps replacing it with a different method for 
government support of charities, and those that defend the deduction on some ground.‖). This Part 
will focus on those in the latter camp.  
 37. Andrews, supra note 27, at 357; see ANDREW CHAMBERLAIN & MARK SUSSMAN, TAX 
FOUND., CHARITIES AND PUBLIC GOODS: THE CASE FOR REFORMING THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 
DEDUCTION FOR CHARITABLE GIFTS 3 (2005) (arguing that the economic justification for the tax 
subsidy to charities requires qualified charities to produce public goods). Economist Andrew 
Chamberlain and adjunct scholar Mark Sussman define ―public good‖ as an economic concept 
meaning to possess properties of ―non-rivalrous consumption‖ and ―non-excludability‖ (meaning 
that people who do not pay to consume a good cannot be prevented from using the good). Id. at 2 & 
n.3. A lighthouse is a commonly cited example of a public good able to fulfill these criteria. See 
9
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that the government might otherwise be responsible for providing, ―such 
as . . . education, scientific research, public improvements, public health, 
and the relief of poverty.‖38 In other cases, ―the deduction is available for 
transfers that [the] government would never make‖ such as donations to 
religious organizations.
39
 All of these organizations, however, are seen to 
provide sufficiently widespread societal benefits that justify their ability to 
receive deductible contributions.
40
  
The requirement that subsidized organizations provide such benefits is 
an important one. Because the cost of the charitable deduction is spread 
among all taxpayers,
41
 the benefits should also be somewhat dispersed.
42
 
However, some organizations subsidized through the charitable deduction 
provide benefits that are more far-reaching than others. For instance, 
                                                                                                                     
generally, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357 (1974) (discussing 
the lighthouse example in the context of economics and public goods). A lighthouse is ―non-
rivalrous‖ because one‘s light supply is not affected by other‘s use and is ―non-excludible‖ because 
individuals cannot reasonably be prevented from viewing it. Id. at 358–59. Further, this ―public 
benefit‖ concept is supported by legislative history. Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the 
Charitable Tax Subsidies: The Role of Distributive Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 505, 508 n.8 
(2010) (―[T]he legal definition of ‗charitable‘ (loosely meaning anything that benefits the 
community at large) is much broader than the popular and colloquial definition (meaning helping 
the poor).‖ (citing JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND 
PRESENT LAW OF THE FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES AND OTHER TAX-EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS 61–64 (2005))).  
 38.  Johnny Rex Buckles, The Community Income Theory of Charitable Contributions 
Deduction, 80 IND. L.J. 947, 952 n.25 (2005). One of the primary arguments in favor of the 
charitable contributions deduction is that donations provide major community benefits. If these 
benefits relieve the federal government of some of the burdens that it otherwise would be required 
to bear (such as expenditures for education, scientific research, public improvements, public health, 
and the relief of poverty), the deduction may reduce the amount of revenues that government must 
raise in order to provide for the common welfare. See Lewis, supra note 24, at 53 (referring to these 
activities as ―mandated functions [which] implicate activities that the federal government has 
primary responsibility (and often exclusive authority) to perform‖).  
 39. Buckles, supra note 38, at 952 n.25.  
 40. Id. at 952. 
 41. Shannon W. McCormack, Taking the Good with the Bad: Recognizing the Negative 
Externalities Created by Charities and Their Negative Implications for the Charitable Deduction, 
52 ARIZ. L. REV. 977, 1001 (2010) (―D‘s tax rate will be higher than it would have been in the 
absence of a charitable deduction, as compensation for the revenue lost by the deduction 
necessitates a higher rate.‖); see also Buckles, supra note 38, at 951 (―[I]f all else is held constant, 
the availability of the charitable contributions deduction means that tax rates must be increased to 
compensate for the diminished income tax base.‖); Surrey, supra note 14, at 726 (noting that both 
direct expenditures (government assistance) and programs funded through deductions ―keep our tax 
rates high‖). 
 42. Hochman & Rodgers, supra note 28, at 227 (―External benefits must accrue in the 
demands for the specific services that charity finances . . . to justify the public subsidization of 
charity. Otherwise, the benefits of giving are private, and no subsidy is warranted.‖); see also id. at 
241 n.10 (―If the benefits of a charity-financed activity have a restricted domain in, say, political or 
spatial terms, those who do not benefit should not be required to help finance it. The members of 
the ‗club,‘ as a self-contained community, should be fully responsible for costs.‖).  
10
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organizations aiming to control nation-wide pollution or to maintain state 
parks benefit a rather broad segment of the population, while other 
organizations, such as local schools and soup kitchens, benefit a far 
narrower group of individuals.
43
 Thus, while it provides an important 
theoretical justification for the charitable deduction, the public benefit 
requirement can be difficult to apply in practice because it requires one to 
determine when a donee-organization provides goods or services that are 
―public enough‖ to allow their donors to deduct contributed amounts.44  
To further illustrate these difficulties, suppose one were to undertake 
the task of determining whether the benefits provided by a small soup 
kitchen should be considered ―sufficiently‖ widespread. While the tax law 
currently allows taxpayers to deduct amounts donated to organizations that 
feed the hungry,
45
 a result with which few would argue,
46
 it is unclear how 
to define the ―benefit‖ that is provided in applying the public benefit 
requirement. If one were to focus upon the food provided, the benefit 
would seem confined to a few aided individuals.
47
 If, however, one were to 
define the benefit more generally as the alleviation of hunger suffered by 
the needy, the benefit would seem more far-reaching.  
Partly because of these difficulties in application, the justification 
                                                                                                                     
 43. Lewis, supra note 24, at 53. In some cases, organizations may provide goods that 
―similarly situated members of the public can typically access and from which the public can benefit 
equally.‖ Id.; see also Buckles, supra note 38, at 969 (―The amenities offered by numerous 
charitable organizations are of a similar nature to those untaxed benefits offered by government, 
business, and the natural environment.‖ (emphasis omitted)). But see Lewis, supra note 24, at 53 
(explaining that the goods and services provided by some organizations ―may benefit some private 
parties substantially more than [others]‖). 
 44. In economic terms the ―public good‖ requirement can at most aspire to identify goods 
―similar to public goods over some range‖ (i.e., to be quasi-public goods). RUSSELL HARDIN, 
COLLECTIVE ACTION 19 (1982); see id. at 18–19 (‗―[W]e are left with the problem of reconciling 
ourselves to a neat definition of collective goods that is apparently inapplicable to nearly all the 
familiar instances of collective goods.‘‖ (quoting E.J. Mishan, The Relationship Between Joint 
Products, Collective Goods, and External Effects, 77 J. POL. ECON. 329, 334 (1969))); see also 
Robert W. Adler, Unfunded Mandates and Fiscal Federalism: A Critique, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1137, 
1249 (1997) (stating that ―‗pure‘ public goods that benefit all national taxpayers equally . . . are 
extremely rare‖); John D. Colombo, Why is Harvard Tax-Exempt? (And Other Mysteries of Tax 
Exemption for Private Educational Institutions), 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 841, 869 (1993) (explaining that 
pure public goods are rare and that most goods and services are imperfect hybrids). 
 45. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B) (West 2010). 
 46. Organizations feeding the hungry are often cited as the base-line example of the type of 
organization that should be able to receive tax-deductible contributions. See, e.g., Gergen, supra 
note 12, at 1406–07, 1413–14 (discussing the Salvation Army and the Red Cross); Henry B. 
Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 840–60 (1980) (discussing CARE 
and the Red Cross).  
 47. In economic terms, the food would fail the definition of a public good rather miserably. 
Once the food is eaten, there will be nothing remaining for others, meaning that it fails to be 
―nonrivalrous.‖ Further, because one can easily be prevented from consuming food for which one 
does not pay, it fails to exhibit the property of ―nonexcludability.‖  
11
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offered by the public benefit theory does not provide discernable limits on 
the subsidy‘s scope.48 As a final (purposefully silly) example, suppose an 
organization aimed to paint all of a town‘s dogs red because the 
organization‘s supporters believed a uniformly colored canine population 
would increase the aesthetic appeal of the ―served‖ locality. Red-dog 
lovers may feasibly claim that an entire community might ―benefit‖ from 
the uniformly colored creatures. Without more than the public benefit 
principle, one has little guidance on how to determine whether the 
charitable deduction should be granted in even these circumstances where 
organizations pursue activities most would find ―unique‖ and unworthy of 
government subsidies (a conclusion which the tax law would very likely 
reach).
49
 Efficiency criteria (discussed in the next Part) provide an 
objective method of ensuring that subsidies are provided only to 
―economically needy‖ organizations.50 
B.  Theories of Democracy Promotion and Pluralism 
Other scholars justify the charitable deduction as a method of 
promoting important democratic values by protecting minority viewpoints 
and encouraging ―cultural and associational pluralism.‖51 
                                                                                                                     
 48. Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospitals: Toward 
a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REV. 307, 364–84 (1991) (arguing that the 
community benefit theory does not adequately define or provide any way to measure the community 
benefits that should justify exemption). 
 49. It is worth noting that there are rather unique organizations currently entitled to receive 
charitable deductions. See ROB REICH, LACEY DORN & STEFANIE SUTTON, STANFORD UNIV. CTR. ON 
PHILANTHROPY AND CIVIL SOC‘Y, ANYTHING GOES: APPROVAL OF NONPROFIT STATUS BY THE IRS 
17–18 (2009), available at http://www.stanford.edu/~sdsachs/AnythingGoesPACS1109.pdf 
(identifying such organizations, including the Gateway Sisters of Perpetual Indulgence, 
an organization for ―Drag‖ Nuns; a Christian group reaching outdoorsmen—in particular ―Bubbas‖ 
for Jesus Christ; and the International Society of Talking Clock Collectors, an online museum to 
preserve and share talking clocks); see also CROSSHEIR OUTFITTERS, 
http://www.crossheiroutfitters.org (last visited Apr. 7, 2011); INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY OF TALKING 
CLOCK COLLECTORS, http://www.talkingclocks.net (last visited Apr. 7, 2011).  
 50. See supra Part IV. Alternatively, one runs the risk of having to determine what purposes 
are sufficiently ―good,‖ an inquiry which seems thorny to say the least. The only tool current law 
has against such a result is the so-called ―public policy‖ exception, which has been used in rather 
confined circumstances and certainly would not apply to an organization such as this that seems to 
be pursuing a novel, yet not profoundly harmful activity. For a summary of current cases and IRS 
rulings using this exception, see Johnny Rex Buckles, Reforming the Public Policy Doctrine, 53 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 397, 399–403 (2005); Miriam Galston, Public Policy Constraints on Charitable 
Organizations, 3 VA. TAX REV. 291, 291–97 (1984); Nicholas A. Mirkay, Is It “Charitable” to 
Discriminate?: The Necessary Transformation of Section 501(c)(3) into the Gold Standard for 
Charities, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 45, 61–68. 
 51. Wiedenbeck supra note 12, at 96. Wiedenbeck also argues ―[t]hat the charitable 
deduction may reflect a judgment that pluralism should be valued in its own right.‖ Id. at 96–97; see 
also, e.g., Bittker, supra note 13, at 45 (―No public program is immune to . . . attempts to foster one 
set of values and discourage another, but the definition of exempt organizations by . . . the Code and 
12
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The charitable deduction acts as a taxpayer-triggered subsidy,
52
 
granting individual citizens the ability to allocate public funds to the 
organizations of their choosing.
53
 Some argue that this is superior to a 
program in which members of Congress would be responsible for these 
allocations. While the deduction ensures that subsidies are granted even to 
organizations with small support bases, a direct assistance program would 
fail to do so since politicians would cater to majority wishes at the expense 
of projects supported by less politically powerful groups.
54
 In contrast, the 
argument continues, deductions allow each taxpayer to transform 
contributions into votes
55
 and form diverse groups that can fund minority 
projects.
56
  
While also an important justification for the charitable deduction, this 
rationale still fails to provide discernible limitations on its scope. A pure 
application of the idea that deductions should be granted whenever it 
would promote diversity would seem to allow almost limitless subsidies. 
Even those supporting the dog painting organization could argue that these 
organizations (like any other) would add to the mixture of expressed 
viewpoints and that a charitable deduction is therefore justified. While it is 
not suggested that all those promoting these theories would support this 
                                                                                                                     
the administration of this definition by the tax authorities have been relatively free of bias.‖); 
Miranda Perry Fleischer, Generous to a Fault? Fair Shares and Charitable Giving, 93 MINN. L. 
REV. 165, 168 (2008) (―[C]haritable tax subsidies allow individuals whose preferences differ from 
the classic majority to redirect a portion of funds otherwise flowing to the federal treasury toward 
their preferred visions of the public good.‖); Levmore, supra note 13, at 404 (―[T]he tax system can 
be seen as allowing taxpayers individually to allocate federal money to worthy causes.‖); Burton A. 
Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in a Three-Sector Economy, in THE 
ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS 21, 31 (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986) (―[T]he relative 
size of the voluntary sector . . . can be expected to be a function of the heterogeneity of population 
demands.‖). 
 52. See Bittker, supra note 13, at 39 (discussing the power of private persons to allocate 
government funds);  Levmore, supra note 13, at 405 (―Hence each individual taxpayer‘s choice, 
deduction, or ―ballot,‖ not only reflects a private contribution but also triggers a matching 
government contribution in the form of a reimbursement of part of the taxpayer-donor‘s gift.‖). See 
generally Fleischer, supra note 51, at 189 (―[U]sing a deduction or credit means that individual 
taxpayers decide which charities receive the subsidies and how large the subsidies should be.‖). 
 53. Fleischer, supra note 51, at 189. 
 54. See Weisbrod, supra note 51, at 23–26, 36–37 (using an economic model to suggest that 
the government provision of nonprofit services will align with interests of the majority of voters). 
See Bittker, supra note 13, at 46 (―I must say that I have very little confidence that a system of 
matching grants could be administered without administrative and congressional investigations, 
loyalty oaths, informal or implicit warnings against heterodoxy and the other trappings of 
governmental support that the tax deduction has, so far, been able to escape.‖). 
 55. Levmore, supra note 13, at 389 (characterizing the charitable deduction as balloting 
through the tax system). 
 56. Fleischer, supra note 51, at 207–10 (arguing that the charitable deduction acts as a 
bargain between a democratically defined majority and a majority of individual donors which 
represent minority interests, characterized as the ―dual majority bargain‖).  
13
McCormack: Too Close to Home: Limiting the Organizations Subsidized by the C
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
870 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
 
result,
 57
 it does suggest the need for (or, at the very least, the desirability of 
considering) additional economic limits on the deduction‘s scope.  
C.  Altruism Theory 
Proponents of what might be referred to as ―altruism theory‖ would 
provide deductions for all altruistic transfers, thereby subsidizing altruism 
as a good in and of itself. For instance, famous tax scholar Professor Boris 
I. Bittker argues that ―something can be said for rewarding activities which 
in a certain sense are selfless, even if the reward serves no incentive 
function.‖58 Thus, altruism theory would allow a charitable deduction for 
donations made to any donee-organization so long as the donor-taxpayer 
possessed the requisite motivation.  
To state the obvious, in implementing these ideas, lawmakers would 
confront many practical challenges. For instance, they would need to 
define altruism, which some economic and behavioral scholars do not 
believe exists.
59
 Further, even if a workable definition were possible, one 
would also have to devise a mechanism to separate acts that meet this 
definition from all others.
60
 This would all seem rather subjective, perhaps 
requiring a thorny moral inquiry into ―what is ultimately good.‖61  
                                                                                                                     
 57. Professor Miranda Perry Fleischer describes the ambiguity eloquently:  
Unfortunately, it is somewhat unclear exactly what these theorists mean when they 
invoke ―pluralism‖ and related terms (such as ―diversity‖). Often, it seems they 
believe our society should affirmatively seek to encourage numerous views in 
order to promote a counter-weight to government power, experimentation in the 
way public goods are produced, a rich debate, a marketplace of ideas, and the like. 
Another take on pluralism, however, is that we live in a pluralistic society where 
individuals have differing conceptions of what is beneficial to society and that, in 
the interests of neutrality, the tax subsidies should not differentiate among them. 
Pluralism can thus encompass either a positive duty to promote alternative 
viewpoints or, more simply, a duty not to discriminate among various viewpoints. 
Both understandings of ―pluralism‖ seem to be present in discussions of the 
charitable tax subsidies.  
Fleischer, supra note 37, at 524 n.101. 
 58. Bittker, supra note 13, at 60. In his article, Bittker ―offer[s] a defense of the deduction 
even if it turns out to be ‗inefficient,‘ failing to operate effectively as an incentive to private 
philanthropy.‖ Id. 
 59. As Colombo explains, ―Economics is the most dependent upon the view of individuals as 
self-interested, rational actors striving to maximize their own utility.‖ Colombo, supra note 28, at 
670 (citing Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. 
REV. 608, 624 (1998); Thomas S. Ulen, Rational Choice and the Economic Analysis of Law, 19 L. 
& SOC. INQUIRY 487, 487–91 (1994)).  
 60. See Colombo, supra note 28, at 677 (―‗[I]gnoring motive may be a necessity for the tax 
system; the search for purity of charitable intention would be an unmanageable task, even ignoring 
the complications caused by psychoanalytic theory.‘‖ (quoting John G. Simon, The Tax Treatment 
of Nonprofit Organizations: A Review of Federal and State Policies, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK 67, 86 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987))).  
 61. Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501, 630 (1990).  
14
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Some scholars, however, have sought to objectify the definition.
62
 For 
instance, Professor Rob Atkinson offers a definition of altruism
63
 that does 
not require one to assess the internal motivations of giving.
64
 Instead, 
Atkinson suggests that the tax law use ―weak‖ altruism as its measure, 
which exists whenever ―one party confers a benefit on another without the 
expectation of a material reward.‖65 Recognizing that this puts 
―considerable pressure on defining the forbidden reciprocal benefit,‖66 
Atkinson appears to find donors sufficiently altruistic so long as they do 
not receive ―preclusive benefits‖ (benefits confined to members of the 
donor‘s household)67 in exchange for their donations. He, for instance, 
finds altruism in donations to performing arts organizations that allow 
attendees to pay a price of their own choosing in return for admission, 
explaining that even if ―patrons pay no more . . . than [what] 
admission . . . is worth to them personally . . . they are necessarily 
conferring a benefit on others, and a benefit that they need not confer in 
order to enjoy the same benefit for themselves.‖68  
However, even this objective version of altruism theory fails to provide 
discernible limitations on the scope of the charitable deduction.
69
 Without 
further criteria, donors could deduct contributions made to any 
organization (including the dog painting organization) so long as they did 
not receive the ―forbidden‖ benefit in return.70 Once again, efficiency 
                                                                                                                     
 62. I by no means address all possible theories of altruism. See, for example, Colombo, supra 
note 28, at 667–79, for a summary of other methods of defining altruism.  
 63. I must be clear that Professor Atkinson seeks to determine when an organization should 
receive a tax exemption. However, because §§ 501(c)(3) and 170 effectively mirror one another, I 
have assumed that he would also support a charitable deduction in the same instances.  
 64. Atkinson, supra note 61, at 527–29. Atkinson, for instance, expressly rejects Amartya 
Sen‘s notion of ―strong altruism,‖ which requires one to distinguish between actions motivated by 
sympathy and those motivated by commitment. It is only the latter, according to Sen, which can be 
considered true altruism, as sympathy-motivated actions cause pleasure for the individual who helps 
correct the situation for which the sympathy arose. Id. at 527 (citing Amartya Sen, Rational Fools: 
A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317, 326 
(1970)). Atkinson, along with other scholars, recognize the impossibility of determining these 
psychological nuances. Atkinson writes: ―How can we ever know that what prompts the rescue of a 
drowning child is not the desire for social acclaim, even at the risk of death, or the desire for a 
conscience clear of having refused assistance, even if such a conscience must be purchased with 
one‘s life?‖ Id. at 527 (citing Gergen, supra note 12, at 1433 n.137). Thus, he concludes, ―[W]ith 
an eye toward identifying a characteristic of nonprofits that can serve as an objective basis for their 
tax exemption, ‗weak‘ altruism seems the better candidate.‖ Id. at 529. 
 65. Id. at 523. 
 66. Id. at 531.  
 67. See Andrews, supra note 27, at 313–15. 
 68. Atkinson, supra note 61, at 540; see also Hansmann, supra note 46, at 858 (using also 
performing arts to illustrate price discrimination). 
 69. In his words, Atkinson recognizes that his definition requires one to confront the ―risks in 
letting a thousand flowers bloom.‖ Atkinson, supra note 61, at 636. 
 70. See id. at 531. Alternatively, it could require one to engage in the moral inquiry into 
15
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criteria would provide objective, economic limits on the deduction.  
It should be noted that some scholars of altruism theory would not 
support the use of efficiency based constraints. Professor Atkinson, for 
instance, would explicitly allow donors to deduct amounts ―altruistically‖ 
donated to ―eccentric‖ organizations71 stating that ―even [when] the 
particular purposes for which donors set aside resources [are] truly 
pointless, this . . . loss must be counted against the more general gain of 
allowing . . . the choice of altruistic objects.‖72 Similarly, Professor Bittker 
explicitly justifies the deduction to reward selflessness ―even if the reward 
serves no incentive function.‖73  
With due recognition of these objections, most would find it important 
to (at least) explore the way in which efficiency criteria can limit the 
organizations subsidized by the charitable deduction to those in economic 
need,
74
 a task which the predominant theories justifying the deduction fail 
to accomplish.  
IV.  LIMITING THE SCOPE OF THE CHARITABLE DEDUCTION TO 
UNDERFUNDED ORGANIZATIONS: THE UNDERFUNDING 
REQUIREMENT DEVELOPED AND EXPLAINED 
In his often-cited article, The Case for a Charitable Contributions 
Deduction, Professor Mark P. Gergen uses efficiency concepts to limit the 
scope of the deduction. Gergen would use the charitable deduction only 
when the goods or services provided by the donee-organization would be 
underfunded (or sub-optimally provided) in its absence
75
 (the 
                                                                                                                     
―what is ultimately good.‖ Atkinson explicitly recognizes that this is required but (understandably) 
declines to articulate how to do so. Id. at 630; see supra note 50 (discussing the ―public policy‖ 
exemption, which would not apply to ―unique‖ organizations such as the dog painting 
organization).  
 71. Atkinson, supra note 61, at 636. As to more morally questionable organizations, Atkinson 
would allow the public policy exception to limit the deduction. Id. at 625. 
 72. Id. at 636.  
 73. Bittker, supra note 13, at 60.  
 74. As Professor Stanley Surrey has stated:  
A government that decides it is wise to pay out tax credit money via a simple tax 
schedule would be highly irrational if it also decided that it would be unwise to 
pay the same amount directly on the same basis. A dollar is a dollar—both for the 
person who receives it and the government that pays it, whether the dollar comes 
with a tax credit label or a direct expenditure label.  
Surrey, supra note 14, at 717. 
 75. See Gergen, supra note 12, at 1396–1406. Professor Gergen would also grant the 
deduction only when the transfer is efficiency-enhancing, determined by utilizing the Kaldor-Hicks 
method of efficiency. Id. at 1397. There are various methods of evaluating whether a transfer is 
efficient. The Pareto method deems a transfer efficient so long as it ―make[s] at least one person 
better off and no one worse off.‖ ANTHONY B. ATKINSON & JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, LECTURES ON 
PUBLIC ECONOMICS 337 (1980). Realistically, however, a transfer will never truly be Pareto 
16
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―underfunding requirement‖). Underfunding occurs when donor support 
does not meet the needs of donee-organizations. It is, therefore, essential to 
describe two models. First, this Part will develop a ―rational donor model‖ 
to explain the circumstances in which a ―rationally economic donor‖ will 
contribute to a given organization. Second, this Part will develop an 
―optimal subsidization model‖ to determine when goods and services can 
be considered optimally funded (i.e., not underfunded).  
A.  Developing a “Rational Donor Model” and “Optimal 
Subsidization Model” 
Under standard economic assumptions, an economically rational 
individual should be willing to contribute an amount equal in value to the 
monetized benefits he experiences as a result of the donation.
76
 There are 
various ways in which a donor might benefit from his contribution. First, a 
donor may directly benefit from his contribution if he enjoys the goods or 
                                                                                                                     
efficient, since all donations will cause some harm. As Professor Gergen recognizes, there is a 
―darker aspect to this picture: Some people will lose because of a deduction.‖ Gergen, supra note 
12, at 1412. Even if nobody is harmed by a particular transfer, the cost of a deduction is spread 
among all taxpayers, such that those who do not benefit from the deduction will suffer harm, 
rendering the deduction inefficient under the Pareto method. Thus, were the Pareto model used, all 
deductions would be disallowed. See McCormack, supra note 41, at 1001–06. Using the Kaldor-
Hicks model allows efficiency to be considered, while not disallowing deductions in all cases. 
Formally stated, under the Kaldor-Hicks model, ―[o]ne state of affairs (E′) is Kaldor-Hicks efficient 
to another (E) if and only if those whose welfare increases in the move from E to E′ could fully 
compensate those whose welfare diminishes with a net gain in welfare.‖ See JULES L. COLEMAN, 
MARKETS, MORALS, AND THE LAW 98 (1988). The Kaldor-Hicks method is by no means a perfect 
solution, however. As I have written elsewhere, the Kaldor-Hicks method will not always sensibly 
separate transfers that should and should not receive a charitable deduction. McCormack, supra 
note 41, at 1006–11(discussing the failure of Kaldor-Hicks to sufficiently analyze negative 
externalities that may arise from the charitable deduction). This point, however, need not be 
explored further in this Article, which focuses on the separate underfunding requirement.  
 76. A rational economic actor should be indifferent between receiving the good and retaining 
an amount of money equal to the benefit enjoyed by that good. Thus, absent transaction costs, a 
rational purchaser will pay any amount that does not exceed the benefit the good can provide. See 
MICHAEL ANTHONY LEWIS & KARL WIDERQUIST, ECONOMICS FOR SOCIAL WORKERS 16–24 (2001) 
(discussing marginal analysis within assumption of rational self-interested behavior). More 
formally, a donor should be willing to make a particular donation so long as the utility increase he 
experiences from that donation exceeds the utility decrease he experiences by relinquishing the 
money or property. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, A Note on Subsidizing Gifts, 58 J. PUB. ECON. 469, 
470–71 (1995) ( ―There are two types of individuals, donees––each of whose utility is a concave 
function, V, of his own wealth––and donors––each of whose utility is the sum of a concave 
function, U, of his own wealth and λ times a respective donee‘s utility. (Each donor is paired with a 
donee.) Donors‘ and donees‘ initial levels of wealth are w and y, respectively. Each donor chooses a 
gift, g ε [0, w], to transfer to a donee, to maximize U(w - g) + λ V(y + g).‖). This Author fully 
recognizes that economists would develop the ―rational donor model‖ using different terms, by, for 
instance, referring to ―utility functions‖ and measuring benefits in ―utils.‖ In order to avoid this 
terminology, which might unnecessarily alienate the non-economist, the remainder of this Article 
will express benefits in monetized terms.  
17
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services provided by the donee-organization. For instance, one who 
contributes to an organization using donated funds to build a park in his 
neighborhood may enjoy direct benefits.
77
 Next, donors may experience 
―giving benefits,‖78 which refer to benefits derived from the act of giving 
itself.
79
 A donor may, for example, experience a ―warm glow‖80 benefit if 
he experiences positive feelings for helping others
81
 and might enjoy 
―reputational enhancement‖ if others are made aware of his contributions.82 
Continuing with the neighborhood park example, a donor may ―feel good‖ 
for helping his neighbors enjoy the newly constructed park and may enjoy 
an increase in status because of his perceived beneficence.
83
 
Direct and giving benefits are considered ―egoistic‖ because the 
donor‘s benefit is not based on anyone‘s enjoyment but his own.84 
Additionally, the donor may experience a ―non-egoistic‖85 or ―other-
regarding‖86 benefit if he internalizes the benefits of others. In economic 
terms, this occurs when the donor‘s so-called ―utility function‖—which 
describes how one‘s satisfaction changes in response to various conditions 
(such as changes in wealth)
87—is ―interdependent‖ with the utility 
                                                                                                                     
 77. See infra Part V.A (discussing the various ways in which a donor may directly benefit 
from his contribution). 
 78. See infra Part V.B (discussing the various ways in which a donor may experience ―giving 
benefits‖ from his contribution). As discussed in that section, some of these benefits might also be 
considered direct benefits. However, this Article will categorize ―giving benefits‖ as all benefits that 
can only be derived by the act of giving itself, because of the inability of donors to free-ride to 
enjoy these benefits. See infra Part V.B. 
 79. See James Andreoni, Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and 
Ricardian Equivalence, 97 J. POL. ECON. 1447, 1448–49 (1989) (―[P]eople get some private goods 
benefit from their gift per se, like a warm glow.‖). 
 80. Id. at 1448 (coining the term).  
 81. Id.; see also Colombo, supra note 28, at 672 (discussing how donors are motivated by 
―personal pleasure from having been the instrument by which . . . welfare has been increased‖). 
 82. See infra Part V.B; see also, e.g., Joel Sobel, Interdependent Preferences and 
Reciprocity, 43 J. ECON. LITERATURE 392, 403 (2005) (―Because agents will forgo consumption to 
increase their status, this formulation is sufficient to be consistent with many apparent departures 
from self interest. Fremling and Posner suggest that dictators will not take the entire surplus in order 
to signal that they are altruistic. Being known as a generous person enhances your status, which will 
put you in a better position to advance your material self interest in the future.‖ (citing Gertrud M. 
Fremling & Richard A. Posner, Market Signaling of Personal Characteristics 1–40, 28–31 (John 
M. Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 87, 1999)).  
 83. For another example, see Colombo, supra note 28, at 671–72 (―[N]aming or 
commemorative opportunities . . . obviously supply such status or reputation enhancement.‖).  
 84. See Andreoni, supra note 79, at 1449 (―[W]e could imagine a person who cares nothing at 
all for the public good, but gives only for the warm glow . . . . The warm glow is an increasing 
function of what is given. We could call such preferences ‗egoistic.‘‖). 
 85. Id.  
 86. See, e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 424 (2002) 
(discussing the ―care and concern that individuals have for others––friends, family, and sometimes 
even society at large‖). 
 87. See F.Y. Edgeworth, The Pure Theory of Taxation, 7 ECON. J. 46, 57 (1897) (describing 
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functions of other beneficiaries of his gift. For instance, the donor in the 
neighborhood park example may experience a benefit because his 
neighbors, for whom he has a degree of affection, have experienced one. 
Put more simply, the donor may consider some of his neighbor‘s benefits 
―his own.‖88  
Putting this together, if a donor is economically rational, he should be 
willing to donate an amount equal in value to the sum of his monetized
89
 
direct benefits, giving benefits, and internalized benefits. This will be 
referred to as the ―rational donor model.‖  
The next task is to determine when goods or services should be 
considered optimally funded (i.e., not underfunded), by developing an 
―optimal subsidization model.‖ Using the so-called ―benefits pricing‖ 
model,
90
 goods and services should be ―funded at the level where the sum 
of the incremental benefits individuals derive from the last unit of the good 
[or service] equals the marginal cost of that unit.‖91 In other words, goods 
and services should be provided so long as the benefits created exceed 
production costs.
92
  
                                                                                                                     
the phenomenon that when income increases, utility decreases); Harvey S. Rosen, Income-Tax 
Progressivity: A Century-Old Debate, BUS. REV., Jan./Feb. 1990, at 3, 6 (―When income 
increases . . . utility increases at a decreasing rate. According to this assumption, when your income 
doubles, you become happier, but not twice as happy. This seems quite sensible. If you give a 
billionaire another billion dollars, chances are that he will value the second billion a lot less than he 
did the first.‖). For more on the concept of utility curves and the marginal utility of wealth, see 
generally, Edgeworth, supra. 
 88. For another example, see John D. Colombo, The Marketing of Philanthropy and the 
Charitable Contributions Deduction 17 (U. Ill. Coll. of Law, Law & Econ. Working Papers Series, 
Working Paper No. 00-11, 2000), available at http://ssrn.com/paper.tar?abstract_id=253058 
(―[T]he husband may buy an expensive anniversary gift for his wife not because of his pleasure at 
having been the gift-giver but because he gains pleasure by seeing his wife pleased by the gift. Here, 
their interests have merged, so that her gain becomes his . . . .‖). 
 89. All benefits will be presumed to be monetized. This Article will not always explicitly state 
this for ease of reading.  
 90. Gergen, supra note 12, at 1400 (citing Hochman & Rodgers, supra note 28, at 224). The 
benefits pricing model is also referred to as the Lindahl solution. See Erik Lindahl, Positive Lösung 
[Just Taxation—A Positive Solution], in DIE GERECHTIGKEIRT DER BESTEUERUNG 85–98 (1919), 
reprinted in CLASSICS IN THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 168, 173 (Richard A. Musgrave & Alan T. 
Peacock eds., Elizabeth Henderson trans., 1958) (―[P]rovided the taxpayers are all in an equal 
position to defend their economic interests when tax laws are passed, the financial process would 
result in each individual having to pay a tax amount corresponding to his valuation of public 
services.‖). See generally Duncan K. Foley, Lindahl’s Solution and the Core of an Economy with 
Public Goods, 38 ECONOMETRICA 66 (1970) (summarizing Lindahl‘s work).  
 91. Gergen, supra note 12, at 1400. 
 92. There is a second condition to the benefits pricing model: ―[E]ach individual [should 
contribute] an amount equal to her marginal benefit from the last unit of the good times the number 
of units provided.‖ Id. This requirement would ensure that no individual would be harmed by 
provision of the good (which would occur if individuals paid more than their benefit.). It is 
important, however, to see that this second condition will not be achieved in practice. See 
McCormack, supra note 41, at 1002 (―Assume . . . that Z is . . . a member of the universe of 
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In developing the rational donor model, the various benefits a donor 
might experience were discussed. It is not clear, however, that all of these 
benefits should be incorporated in the ―optimal subsidization model.‖ Put 
another way, it is not clear that one should account for all of these benefits 
to determine when a particular good or service is underfunded and a 
deduction needed to correct the issue. Most importantly, accounting for 
internalized benefits—i.e., the benefits enjoyed by a donor as a result of the 
benefits of others—would result in ―double counting.‖93 Consider two 
simplified scenarios illustrating this issue. 
First, imagine an organization providing goods to individuals with 
whom a potential donor has no contact or association.
94
 Suppose that under 
a ―hypothetical cost function‖ it would cost $900 to provide the first unit of 
the good, $600 to provide the second unit, and $100 to provide the third 
unit. Assume that under a ―hypothetical aggregate benefits function,‖ 
beneficiaries would enjoy an aggregate $1,000 benefit from the first unit, 
$700 from the second unit, and $70 from the third unit.
95
 Finally, assume a 
                                                                                                                     
taxpayers and that she is not affected by provision of the public good (that is, she is indifferent). [In 
this] example, Taxpayer A will pay the producer of the public good $7 and claim a deduction worth 
$2, allowing the organization to produce the good at the optimal level. Taxpayer A will have paid 
$5 for the good and the cost of his $2 tax savings will be spread between B and Z. Taxpayer B will 
pay less than his marginal benefit for the public good, which is optimal. Thus, the benefit B enjoys 
from the good‘s provision will outweigh his universal subsidization harm, so that he is better off. 
However, Taxpayer Z will pay more than her marginal benefit, presumed to be zero. This ‗excess‘ 
payment is Z‘s universal subsidization harm, as it is not outweighed by any related benefit.‖). As a 
result, the focus of the underfunding discussion in this Article will be on the first condition of 
optimal provision, which is realistically achievable.  
 93. Many scholars have argued for excluding moral sentiments in cost-benefit analysis. See, 
e.g., Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better than 
No Number?, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 45, 47–48 (1994) (asking whether it is useful to have in mind some 
preferences, including moral preferences, as alternatives to true economic preferences); Peter A. 
Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, On Contingent Valuation Measurement of Nonuse Values, in 
CONTINGENT VALUATION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 3, 4 (Jerry A. Hausman ed., 1993) (discussing 
whether nonuse values measured by contingent value methods are internally consistent with the 
economic theory on which they are based and concluding that, ―[I]t is not appropriate to include 
[contingent value] measures of stated willingness to pay (WTP) in . . . benefit-cost analysis . . . .‖); 
K. E. McConnell, Does Altruism Undermine Existence Value?, 32 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 22, 26 
(1997) (arguing that counting benefits representing moral sentiments will distort choice); Paul 
Milgrom, Is Sympathy An Economic Value? Philosophy, Economics, and the Contingent Valuation 
Method, in CONTINGENT VALUATION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 417, 420 (Jerry A. Hausman ed., 
1993) (arguing that including internalized benefits would lead ―to inclusion of projects that violate 
principles of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and would, therefore, exclude moral sentiments in cost-benefit 
analysis). But see, e.g., Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. et al., An Aggregate Measure for Benefit-cost 
Analysis, 58 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 449, 450–51 (2006) (arguing that moral sentiments should be 
included as an aggregate measure in the Kaldor-Hicks model).  
 94. This assumes for simplicity that there is only one potential donor. This is not an 
uncommon analytical approach. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 76, at 470 (illustrating this approach 
by explicitly pairing donors with donees). 
 95. Marginal utility is often declining. LEWIS & WIDERQUIST, supra note 76, at 22. They 
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potential donor does not experience any benefits from his donation—i.e., 
he does not experience direct, giving, or internalized benefits. Under the 
benefits pricing model, it is optimal for the first two units to be provided 
but not the third (because the benefits do not exceed the costs of that unit). 
Thus, in this ―independent scenario,‖ a deduction should be granted when 
needed to ensure two units are provided.  
Consider a second scenario that differs in one respect from the first: the 
donor fully internalizes the benefits of the potential beneficiaries. If one 
were to account for internalized benefits in determining the optimal 
subsidization level, benefits would be ―double counted.‖ Specifically, the 
benefits of providing the first unit would be $2,000 (the $1,000 enjoyed by 
beneficiaries and the $1,000 enjoyed by the donor who internalizes their 
benefits), $1,400 for the second unit, and $140 for the third. Under this 
―double counting‖ model, it would be optimal to provide an additional 
third unit because the benefits would outweigh the costs of providing it. 
Thus, a deduction would be warranted in this ―interdependent scenario‖ 
when needed to ensure that three units are provided.  
If this ―double counting‖ model were used, the government would 
provide greater subsidies (by providing charitable deductions to ensure the 
production of more goods) in the interdependent scenario than the 
otherwise comparable independent scenario.
96
 It is not at all clear that this 
―subsidy bias‖ is desirable.97 A donor is increasingly likely to internalize 
the benefits of those with whom he shares some relationship and is 
increasingly unlikely to do so when his relationship with beneficiaries is 
                                                                                                                     
provide the following example: 
If a cookie costs $1, then for every cookie I eat, I have one less dollar to spend on 
all other goods. The marginal benefit of a cookie is a little bit trickier. You have to 
ask yourself how much you would pay for this cookie. What would be the most I 
would give up for this cookie if I had to? Suppose you eat one cookie and it tastes 
so good that you would be willing to sacrifice $4 worth of other goods to buy 
it. . . . Luckily, you had to pay only $1, so it was a good deal for you. So you have 
another. Now that you have already had a cookie, the second one is not nearly so 
satisfying, but it is still good so you would pay $2 for it. Still a good deal. Now 
that you are becoming satisfied, the third cookie is only worth $1 to you. It costs 
$1, so it is worth it but just barely. You are indifferent to this third unit. That is 
how you know you have reached the optimum, and it is time to stop eating 
cookies. 
Id. at 22. 
 96. See supra note 93 (discussing various arguments for and against the inclusion of moral 
benefits in a cost benefit analysis). 
 97. This illustrates one argument economists have advanced against including ―moral 
sentiments‖ in cost-benefit analysis—that is, projects that would generally be deemed inefficient 
(such as shipping the third unit) would be rendered efficient only because of the inclusion of these 
benefits. See supra note 93. 
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more attenuated.
98
 It would seem odd for the government to provide 
discrepant subsidies solely because of these differing relationships and, 
specifically, to provide greater subsidies to organizations having 
beneficiaries and donors that are acquainted. In fact, one might think it 
should be the very opposite. As discussed above, one justification for the 
charitable deduction is that it subsidizes organizations providing 
sufficiently widespread benefits.
99
 Giving increased subsidies to 
organizations in which donors share relationships with beneficiaries would 
seem to run against this goal. The remainder of this Article will assume 
that internalized benefits should not be used to determine the optimal 
subsidization level.
100
 This would eliminate the bias illustrated in the 
independent and interdependent scenarios by eliminating double counting 
and yielding the same optimal subsidization level for each project.
101
  
There is one further question: Whether giving benefits should be 
accounted for in determining the optimal subsidization level. Conducting a 
similar analysis to the one above, one sees that accounting for this effect 
would provide different subsidies to projects that are identical in all 
respects other than the giving benefits enjoyed by the donor. The question 
is whether subsidy levels should depend on the ability of organizations to 
make donors ―feel good‖ about their contributions.102  
To illustrate, consider two organizations providing goods to residents 
in neighboring impoverished villages. Imagine that the organizations have 
identical cost functions and, for simplicity, that each organization has the 
―hypothetical cost function‖ developed above—it would cost $900 to 
provide one shipment of goods, $600 to provide the second shipment, and 
$100 to provide the third shipment. Further, assume for simplicity that the 
―hypothetical aggregate benefits function‖ developed above applies—
residents would enjoy a $1,000 benefit from the first shipment, $700 from 
the second shipment, and $70 from the third shipment. Assume a potential 
donor will neither enjoy direct benefits nor internalize the benefits of the 
needy beneficiaries. Assume, however, that there is one difference between 
                                                                                                                     
 98. For instance, it is well recognized that ―interdependent preferences are likely to be 
particularly strong between family members.‖ Theodore C. Bergstrom, Systems of Benevolent 
Utility Functions, 1 J.PUB. ECON. THEORY 71, 76 (1999); see also Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. 
Pollak, Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 139, 142–46 (1996) 
(discussing common preferences within the family); cf. Robert A. Pollak, Interdependent 
Preferences, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 309, 311–12 (1976) (―[A] man‘s preferences will be influenced 
more by the consumption of those with whom he has close contact than by those with whom his 
contact is more distant.‖ (citing JAMES S. DUESENBERRY, INCOME, SAVING AND THE THEORY OF 
CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 27 (1962)). 
 99. See supra Part III.A.  
 100. Non-donors might internalize the benefits of other beneficiaries as well. For similar 
reasons, these internalized benefits will also be excluded from the optimal subsidization model.  
 101. That is, in both cases, it would be optimal to provide the second unit but not the third.  
 102. See Andreoni, supra note 79, at 1457.  
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these two otherwise identical organizations: the first organization sends out 
an annual pamphlet showing pictures of beneficiaries while the other does 
not (or cannot afford to) do so. As a result, a hypothetical donor 
contributing to the first organization will enjoy a ―warm glow‖ benefit of 
$50 per shipment but will not experience ―warm glow‖ benefits when 
donating to the second organization.
103
 If giving benefits (such as ―warm 
glow‖ benefits) were used to calculate the level of optimal provision, it 
would be optimal to make three shipments to the village served by the 
―warm glow‖ organization because the addition of these giving benefits 
would cause the total benefits of the third shipment to exceed its costs. It 
would, however, be optimal to make only two shipments to the village 
served by the ―non-warm glow‖ organization.  
This result again seems strange. It is not clear why the government 
should subsidize the provision of more goods to one impoverished village 
than another purely because one organization possesses the ability to make 
donors feel good about their donations.
104
 More generally, it seems odd for 
the government to provide greater subsidies to projects of ―warm glow 
organizations‖ over otherwise identical projects of ―non-warm glow 
organizations.‖ The remainder of this Article will assume that giving 
                                                                                                                     
 103. In reality, the warm glow is dependent on the amount the donor gives—i.e., the greater 
the gift, the larger the warm glow effect. See id. at 1449. While making the benefit dependent on 
shipment illustrates the point more simply, the point is unchanged if one were to express the warm 
glow benefits in terms of dollars donated.  
 104.  In fact, one might again think it should be the opposite. As will be discussed below, the 
warm glow may cause free-riders to make some contribution, suggesting that the ―warm glow‖ 
organization should, if anything, be provided a lesser subsidy. See RICHARD CORNES & TODD 
SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 264 (1986); Richard 
Cornes & Todd Sandler, Easy Riders, Joint Production, and Public Goods, 94 ECON. J. 580, 580 
(1984); Akram Temimi, Does Altruism Mitigate Free-riding and Welfare Loss?, 8 ECON. BULL. 1, 
6–7 (2001). Professor Gergen has explained the way in which the ―joys of giving‖ can lead not only 
to optimal provision but ―supraoptimal provision.‖ He writes:  
Because of the joys of giving, philanthropy (and other forms of charity) may 
be a ―supraoptimal‖ solution to funding collective goods. It makes philanthropists 
happier, because undoubtedly they enjoy giving voluntarily more than they would 
enjoy paying similar amounts in taxes or in user fees. Their philanthropy also 
benefits the rest of us. Philanthropists give more than they would pay for a good 
under a pricing regime, so that the rest of us may pay less for the good while still 
enjoying it at an optimal level. Philanthropists, in essence, redistribute resources 
to us in return for our respect or their own self-respect.  
Circumstances may arise in which the pleasures of giving induce people to 
overinvest in goods. If a good is already funded at close to an optimal level, gifts 
made for the pleasure or prestige of giving will allocate excessive resources to it. 
Overbuilding on campuses because of a donor ―edifice complex‖ is an example of 
this. 
Gergen, supra note 12, at 1408–09.  
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benefits should not be used to account for the optimal subsidization level, 
eliminating this second ―subsidy bias.‖105  
The resulting ―optimal subsidization model,‖ which excludes 
internalized and giving benefits, will be used for the remainder of this 
Article. According to this model, goods and services should be produced 
so long as the sum of the direct benefits experienced by donors and the 
direct benefits experienced by non-donors exceed the costs of production. 
For the reasons discussed, this model seems an intuitive interpretation that 
eliminates ―subsidy biases‖ for otherwise identical projects that differ only 
in the relationship shared by the donor and the beneficiaries of his 
donation
106
 and in the ability of the donor to experience giving benefits. 
This Article does not, however, claim to resolve definitively the issue of 
whether and to what extent one should account for these benefits. This 
resolution must be reserved for future work and to the extent contrary 
conclusions are reached (i.e., it is deemed desirable to ―double count‖ 
benefits or account for giving benefits in determining optimal provision), 
the analysis of this Article would change.  
Returning to the now-developed models, a rational donor should be 
willing to donate an amount equal to the sum of the monetized benefits he 
receives as a result of his contribution. Thus, when those that directly 
benefit from the goods or services provided by a donee-organization are 
economically rational and financially capable of donating, optimal 
provision should be achieved without the need for the charitable deduction. 
To illustrate,
107
 imagine an organization would build a public park in one-
acre increments. Using the ―hypothetical cost function‖ for simplicity, 
assume it would cost $900 to construct one acre, $600 to construct the 
second acre, and $100 to construct the third. Further, let us use the 
hypothetical aggregate benefits function but now explore how benefits are 
distributed. Assume that both A and B would enjoy direct benefits from the 
park by, for instance, using it for recreational purposes. Assume A would 
enjoy an $800 benefit from the first acre of park and B would enjoy a $200 
benefit from that acre (resulting in an aggregate $1,000 benefit). Further, 
assume that A would enjoy a $500 benefit from the second acre, that B 
would derive a $200 benefit (resulting in an aggregate $700 benefit), and 
                                                                                                                     
105. Importantly, this seems consistent with Erik Lindahl‘s original articulation of the benefits 
pricing model, in which each individual ―pay[s] [an] amount corresponding to his valuation of 
public services.‖ Lindahl, supra note 90, at 173 (emphasis added). Giving benefits are not, by 
definition, derived from the public service provided but from the act of donating. See Andreoni, 
supra note 79, at 1448–49.  
 106. The argument for excluding internalized benefits of non-donor beneficiaries would use 
the same reasoning—it is not clear why the government should provide discrepant subsidies to 
identical projects differing only in the relationship shared by other beneficiaries. See supra note 
100. 
 107. See McCormack, supra note 41, at 992–95 (providing another numerical illustration of 
the benefits pricing model).  
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that A and B would each enjoy a $60 and $10 respective benefit from the 
third acre (resulting in a $70 aggregate benefit). As with the other 
examples, it is optimal for the organization to provide two units (here, 
acres) of park.
108
 The park will be provided at this optimal level if both A 
and B (as well as Organization C) are rational economic actors because 
each should be willing to pay an amount equal to the benefit they receive 
from the two-acre park.
109
 Specifically, A should be willing to donate 
$1,300 and B should be willing to donate $400 to help Organization C fund 
these two acres. This will enable Organization C to construct the optimal 
park because donations cover needed costs. Because Organization C does 
not suffer underfunding problems, it is economically unnecessary to allow 
A and B to deduct their contributions.  
However, underfunding may occur even when direct beneficiaries are 
financially capable of contributing. These beneficiaries may not donate 
rationally—i.e., they may contribute less than the rational donor model 
predicts—because they assume that others will contribute and they can 
enjoy benefits free of cost. In this way, collective action problems may 
cause goods and services to be sub-optimally provided,
110
 creating a 
situation in which the charitable deduction is economically needed to 
prevent underfunding.  
B.  Using the Deduction to Correct Collective Action Problems 
Modifying the last example, suppose that A is still willing to pay 
$1,300 for the two-acre park (which equals his direct benefit) but that B is 
no longer willing to pay anything, even though he will still directly benefit 
in the assumed manner. A‘s $1,300 donation will not cover the costs 
needed to construct the two-acre park, resulting in underfunding. In this 
example, where B is not willing to pay for a good or service that would 
directly benefit him, he may be acting as a ―free-rider.‖ A collective action 
or free-rider problem occurs when individuals fail to contribute toward a 
particular goal or project (here, funding a park) even though each ―would 
gain if, as a group, they acted to achieve their common interest or 
                                                                                                                     
 108. The $1,000 and $700 aggregate benefits enjoyed by A and B from the respective first and 
second acres exceeds the $900 and $600 respective costs. The third acre should not be produced 
because the $70 aggregate benefits do not exceed the $100 cost.  
 109. Under the rational donor model, a donor will make a donation at least equal to his 
monetized benefits.  
 110. This has been long recognized by notable scholars. See generally MANCUR OLSON, JR, 
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 27–28 (1965); 
Hochman & Rodgers, supra note 28, at 225 (―To the extent that voluntary cooperation, unassisted, 
produces suboptimal levels of provision, the preferential tax treatment of voluntary contributions is 
one way of improving matters.‖); Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 
REV. ECON. & STAT. 387, 389 (1954) (identifying the ―heart of the whole problem of social 
economy: . . . any one person can hope to snatch some selfish benefit in a way not possible under 
the self-policing competitive pricing of private goods‖). 
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objective . . . .‖111 Individuals often free-ride because they hope ―to enjoy 
the amounts of the [goods or services] . . . financed by the contributions of 
others.‖112 Here, A‘s large contribution will enable Organization C to 
construct a large percentage of the two-acre park.
113
 Because B is able to 
enjoy this portion, he may not donate the remaining $200 needed to 
construct the optimal park even though his benefit exceeds that amount.
114
  
A perfectly designed charitable deduction can correct these 
underfunding issues.
115
 Using the provided example, if A received a 
deduction worth $200 when he donated to Organization C, he would be 
willing to contribute at least $1,500 because the after-tax cost of his 
donation would still be $1,300 (his direct benefit). Thus, this charitable 
deduction would restore optimal provision. This example is obviously 
oversimplified in various respects. It, for instance, assumes there are only 
two individuals who could potentially donate and directly benefit from the 
donation. When one expands the universe of potential beneficiaries, one 
sees how free-riding can create more drastic underfunding problems. If 
many beneficiaries act like B and fail to donate in hopes of benefitting 
from the contributions of others, then ―little or none of the good will be 
supplied, even though collective demand for the good is quite high.‖116 The 
charitable deduction can, therefore, act as an important mechanism for 
subsidizing organizations that cannot garner sufficient donations on their 
own. 
When underfunding is caused by free-rider problems, those that 
directly benefit from the goods or services provided by the donee-
organization fail to contribute because they hope to benefit from others‘ 
donations. There is, however, another way that underfunding may occur, 
which will be referred to in this Article as the externality problem.  
 
                                                                                                                     
 111. OLSON, supra note 110, at 2. 
 112. Hansmann, supra note 46, at 849. 
 113. Even assuming the park can only be provided in acre-increments, A‘s donation will allow 
one acre to be provided. However, it is even more likely that the park can be provided in continuous 
increments so that something far closer to two acres can be provided by A‘s donation.  
 114.  See, e.g., Hochman & Rodgers, supra note 28, at 227 (arguing that, ―[S]ome individuals 
fail to contribute, not because they place no marginal value on the activity, but because they are 
better off as ‗free riders,‘ to wit, they view the cost of its expansion, so long as they must contribute, 
as excessive and permit others to pay for their benefits.‖); George J. Stigler, Free Riders and 
Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. MGMT. SCI. 
359, 359 (providing an example of the free rider problem). 
115. See Gergen, supra note 12, at 1403 (explaining that the deduction corrects underfunding 
caused by collective action problems by ―enabl[ing] people with a high preference for a good [here, 
A] to shift some of its cost to low-preference free-riders [here, B]‖); Hochman & Rodgers, supra 
note 28, at 227–32. The authors argue that the deduction shifts costs to free-riders across 
communities.  
 116. Hansmann, supra note 46, at 849. 
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C.  Using the Deduction to Correct Externality Problems 
Reconsider the public park example. Recall that it is optimal for a two-
acre park to be provided, which will cost $1,500 to construct and which 
will result in A and B enjoying direct benefits of $1,300 and $400, 
respectively. Because B may be content to enjoy the majority of the park 
funded by A‘s $1,300 contribution, collective action problems may cause 
underfunding.
117
 However, optimal provision could still be achieved if A 
were to contribute the remaining $200 needed to cover the costs of the 
two-acre park. Under the rational donor model, a donor will contribute an 
amount equal to the sum of his (monetized) direct benefits, giving 
benefits, and internalized benefits. Thus, if A were to internalize at least 
$200 of B‘s benefit from the park—that is, if he were to make $200 of B‘s 
benefit ―his own‖—he would be willing to donate that additional amount. 
As discussed, donors (such as A) will internalize the benefits of others 
(such as B) only to the extent that their utility functions are interdependent. 
Depending on A‘s relationship with B, A may not internalize a sufficient 
portion of B‘s benefit to allow optimal funding.  
Thus, in this example, underfunding may be caused by a combination 
of collective action problems and what will be referred to as externality 
problems. The collective action problem explains the failure of direct 
beneficiaries (such as B) to contribute an amount equal to their benefit 
while the externality problem explains the failure of donors (such as A) to 
internalize the benefits of other beneficiaries (such as B). In addition to 
responding to the former problem, a properly designed charitable deduction 
can be used to correct the underfunding issues caused by the latter 
problem.
118
 Building from the public park example, suppose that A and B 
are neighbors and that their utility functions are somewhat interdependent. 
Because of this interdependence, suppose A will internalize $50 of B‘s 
benefit. Using the rational donor model, A should be willing to donate an 
additional $50, so that $150 is still needed for optimal provision. If A were 
also allowed a deduction worth $150, he would be willing to donate the 
full $200 needed to optimally fund the park.
119
  
                                                                                                                     
 117. See supra Part IV.B.  
 118. Kaplow, supra note 76, at 475. Professor Louis Kaplow argues that the deduction should 
be granted for many ―other-regarding‖ transfers, not only including charitable donations (which are, 
of course, deductible) but also including intra-family gifts (which are not currently deductible) so 
long as these transfers are welfare-enhancing. This Article does not explore the exact circumstances 
in which transfers will be welfare enhancing. For a detailed analysis of this point, see generally 
Kaplow, supra note 76. In essence, Kaplow argues that the transfer is welfare enhancing (and a 
deduction warranted) whenever the utility gain from the transfer exceeds the utility loss the donor 
suffers as a result of his donation. Id. at 470.  
119. A is willing to give an additional $200 because his after tax cost of giving this additional 
amount would be only $50 (the additional amount A is willing to contribute as a result of the 
assumed internalized benefits from the park). A deduction such as this is economically desirable if it 
is also welfare-enhancing. Id.  
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In other cases, underfunding problems will be primarily caused by 
externality problems. Consider, for instance, organizations that directly 
benefit groups that are financially incapable of donating, such as the needy, 
children, and animals.
120
 Those who donate to these organizations are 
unlikely to enjoy significant direct benefits from their contributions.
121
 In 
these cases, donations will be increasingly dependent on the donor‘s 
internalized benefits and underfunding issues most aptly described by the 
externality problem (the failure of donors to make the benefits of others 
―their own‖). To illustrate, assume that an organization serving the needy 
could optimally provide food for a cost of $1,500, resulting in a much 
greater $5,000 monetized benefit for those nourished. Assume that a 
potential donor would not enjoy direct or giving benefits and would 
internalize only a small $50 portion of the benefits of the unknown food-
recipients. If a deduction worth $1,450 were provided, the externality 
problem would be resolved and this donor would be willing to contribute 
the $1,500 needed for optimal provision.
122
 These examples are again 
oversimplified but illustrate how the charitable deduction can be used to 
correct underfunding caused by externality problems.  
V.  APPLYING THE UNDERFUNDING REQUIREMENT 
The last Part showed how application of the efficiency-based 
underfunding requirement can theoretically limit the organizations 
subsidized by the charitable deduction to those in economic need. Of 
course, unlike the simplified examples provided, it is not realistically 
possible to provide a perfectly tailored subsidy that corrects the specific 
underfunding problems suffered by individual organizations. To do so, one 
would have to apply the optimal subsidization model to every subsidized 
organization, which seems implausible not only because of the vast 
number of these organizations,
123
 but also because it would be exceedingly 
                                                                                                                     
120. There are many organizations such as these. For instance, there are 4,357 organizations 
registered with the IRS using ―animal‖ descriptors. Search for Charities, Online Version of 
Publication 78, supra note 1 (search ―animal‖). Though, note, this simplified search yields a list of 
organizations and intended beneficiaries ranging from the American Society for the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Animals to the Society of Animal Artists.  
 121. While it ―could be argued . . . that we are all members of humanity, and any gift that 
improves the lot of the race redounds to the donor‘s benefit,‖ Atkinson, supra note 61, at 536, the 
direct benefits seem rather slight.  
 122. Using Kaplow‘s model, it is desirable to use the deduction in this way when the donation 
is welfare-enhancing. See Kaplow, supra note 76 (arguing in favor of deductions for charitable gifts 
that increase social welfare). This donation is welfare enhancing if the utility loss suffered by the 
donor when he contributes the needed $1,500 is less than the utility gain enjoyed by the 
beneficiaries. This Author recognizes these additional limitations but has not discussed them at 
length in this Part‘s simplified discussion of efficiency concepts.  
 123. See Search for Charities, Online Version of Publication 78, supra note 1. A recent article 
in the New York Times reported that ―[t]he number of organizations that can offer their donors a tax 
break in the name of charity has grown more than 60 percent in the United States, to 1.1 million in 
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difficult to quantify the marginal benefits created by the goods and services 
provided (as required by the model).
124
 Further, to precisely assess the 
severity of individual collective action problems, one would need to apply 
the rational donor model to each potential donor and to assess the severity 
of specific externality problems one would need to determine the extent to 
which the utility functions of donors and beneficiaries were 
interdependent.
125
 However, while one cannot precisely determine whether 
and to what extent any given organization or type of organization will 
suffer from underfunding problems, a general assessment can provide a 
starting point for evaluating the current scope of the charitable deduction.  
The remainder of this Article will provide this assessment. To do so, 
four hypothetical donations will be considered, all of which are generally 
entitled to the charitable deduction under current law: donations to an 
organization that provides toys to children in a remote village,
126
 donations 
to an organization that funds opera productions,
127
 donations to a specific 
church
128
 used to fund religious, as opposed to other charitable, activities
129
 
                                                                                                                     
[the last] decade.‖ Stephanie Strom, Charities Rise, Costing U.S. Billions in Tax Breaks, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 6, 2009, at A1. A recent study conducted by the Stanford University Center on 
Philanthropy and Civil Society explains this growth and shows that the IRS approved over 98% of 
applications filed by organizations seeking tax-exempt status. REICH ET AL., supra note 49, at 8. 
124. For instance, there is the ―preference revelation‖ problem. In order to meaningfully apply 
the Lindahl solution in which each individual contributes an amount equal to his benefit, 
individuals must reveal their true preferences for goods. It is, however, in each individual‘s interest 
to underreport his preferences. Samuelson, supra note 110, at 388–89 (―[I]t is in the selfish interest 
of each person to give false signals, to pretend to have less interest in a given collective 
consumption activity than he really has, etc.‖); see also Edward H. Clarke, Multipart Pricing of 
Public Goods, 11 PUB. CHOICE 17, 18–22 (1971) (discussing the preference revelation problem); 
Roger B. Myerson, Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem, 47 ECONOMETRICA 61, 
67–73 (1979) (discussing incentive efficiency); William Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions, 
and Competitive Sealed Tenders, 16 J. FIN. 8, 24–26 (1961) (articulating a theoretical auction 
method that would later be called the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction, which would lead each 
individual to reveal his true preference). While theoretically interesting, it is not clear that this can 
be practically applied. See, e.g., Michael H. Rothkopf, Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves Process Is Not Practical, 55 OPERATIONS RES. 191, 191–95 (2007) (arguing that the process 
is of limited value because it compromises on other practical issues).  
 125. Professor Kaplow fully recognizes these administrative difficulties. It would, for instance, 
require ―social authorit[ies to know] which individuals were donors, . . . donees, [and beneficiaries], 
the level of altruism, the initial levels of wealth, and the functional form for utility of individuals‘ 
own wealth . . . . [M]uch of this information will be unobservable (or costly to observe).‖ Kaplow, 
supra note 76, at 471.  
 126. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (as amended in 2008) (defining charitable to include 
―[r]elief of the poor‖).  
 127. Search for Charities, Online Version of Publication 78, supra note 1 (search ―opera‖). 
 128. This Article uses available data to discuss the case of church donations. The Article uses 
the term ―church‖ because relevant data have tended to focus on organizations categorized in these 
terms. This Author recognizes, however, that the discussion is necessarily generalized. Further 
analysis on different religious practices must be reserved for future work.  
 129. This, therefore, recognizes that a religious organization can perform both religious and 
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(including those made by congregants who regularly attend its services and 
events),
130
 and donations to a specific school (including those made by 
parents of its students).
131
 While current tax law generally allows donors to 
claim the charitable deduction in each of these situations, the analysis 
suggests that the severity of underfunding problems experienced by these 
donee-organizations may be greatly varied and that the latter two 
organizations may suffer these issues only minimally. Part VI will explain 
how this analysis can be of more general use.  
In order to analyze these cases, recall that a rational donor will 
contribute an amount equal to the sum of the (monetized) direct benefits, 
giving benefits, and internalized benefits experienced. This Part will 
proceed by analyzing each of these benefits in turn. It will discuss whether 
and to what extent donors can be expected to enjoy these specific benefits 
in the four hypothetical scenarios. Further, it will explain how the presence 
of these benefits could affect the relative severity of collective action and 
externality problems and discuss how this affects the likelihood that goods 
and services will be underfunded according to the optimal subsidization 
model. Numerical examples will be provided for illustrative purposes only 
and are in no way meant to imply mathematical certitude.  
This Part begins with a discussion of the direct benefits experienced by 
donors who are able to enjoy the goods or services funded by their 
donations.  
A.  Direct Benefits 
As discussed above, donee-organizations should not be underfunded 
when those who directly benefit from the goods and services provided are 
both economically rational and financially able to donate. In these cases, 
goods and services should be optimally provided without the charitable 
deduction, rendering the subsidy economically unnecessary.
132
  
                                                                                                                     
charitable functions. This Article focuses upon donations used to finance the former purpose only 
and the analysis is not meant to apply to donations used to finance the latter functions. For ease of 
reading, this Article will refer to this hypothetical donation as the ―church donation‖ or in other 
similar terms without explicitly mentioning this limitation. This Author wishes to recognize and be 
sensitive to possible objections to this approach. It might be argued that one cannot categorize 
expenses this way. However, statistical data are available which does perform this categorization, 
and importantly, this data suggest that a large percentage of church donations are used for the 
―sacramental‖ functions upon which the analysis focuses. See Aprill, supra note 2, at 865. Another 
objection is that church donors may not always know for which functions their donations are being 
used. While true, to the extent one found that deductions should not be allowed for donations made 
to specific churches to fund religious functions (i.e., because underfunding was not an issue), 
various mechanisms could be devised to preserve deductions for donations used for other charitable 
activities. See infra note 234. 
 130. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(i) (West 2010).  
 131. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii). 
 132. See supra Part IV.A. 
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Because the toy organization will provide little, if any, direct benefit to 
potential donors (those who might benefit—needy children—are unable to 
donate), contributions will be largely dependent upon giving and 
internalized benefits, discussed later.
133
 However, one can expect many of 
the donors contributing to the other hypothetical organizations—the opera 
organization, a specific school, or a specific church—to experience a 
variety of direct benefits.  
Nonetheless, as discussed, collective action problems may prevent 
these donors from contributing the rational amount, resulting in 
underfunding issues that can be corrected with the charitable deduction. 
There are various reasons why collective action problems are especially 
likely to cause ―charitable‖ organizations to be underfunded. Recall that 
―charitable‖ organizations are presumed to provide goods and services 
offering sufficiently widespread benefits
134
 that must be shared among 
large groups of beneficiaries.
135
 As a result, an individual may perceive 
―little relationship between the size of [his] contribution and the amount of 
the good [he actually] enjoys.‖136 Further, it has been explained:  
[T]he individual‘s contribution is likely to be so small in 
proportion to the total that it will not appreciably affect the 
amount of the good that is provided, and . . . the individual 
will . . . be able to enjoy the amounts of the good that 
are financed by the contributions of others.
137
 
Whether and to what extent these identified conditions will lead to 
collective action problems and sub-optimal funding depends in part on the 
way in which direct benefits are distributed among beneficiaries. 
1.  Assessing Underfunding Problems Based on the Distribution of 
Direct Benefits 
Consider an organization providing a ―sufficiently‖ public good (or 
service) with the now familiar hypothetical cost and aggregate benefit 
functions. It will cost the organization $900 to produce the first unit, $600 
to produce the second, and $100 to produce the third. Next, the first unit 
will produce a $1,000 aggregate benefit, the second unit a $700 aggregate 
benefit, and the third unit a $70 aggregate benefit. Assuming discrete units, 
it is optimal for two units to be produced. If each beneficiary enjoys only 
small benefits (i.e., the beneficaries comprise a low-preference group), 
                                                                                                                     
 133. See infra Part V.B–C.  
 134. See supra Part III.A. 
 135. See Richard A. Musgrave, The Voluntary Exchange Theory of Public Economy, 53 Q. J. 
ECON. 213, 224 n.9 (1939) (―The product of public economy is ‗divisible,‘ in the sense that its 
supply may be increased by small units, but ‗indivisible,‘ in the sense that no separate ‗benefit 
shares‘ may be attributed to individual purchasers.‖). 
 136. Hansmann, supra note 46, at 849. 
 137. Id.  
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collective action problems are extremely likely to occur. For instance, if 
benefits are divided equally among one thousand low-preference 
individuals so that each enjoys a $1 benefit from the first unit, a seventy 
cent benefit from the second unit, and a seven cent benefit from the third 
unit, the conditions causing free-riding are quite clearly present, making 
underfunding likely.
138
 Each beneficiary in this low-preference group will 
believe his small contribution to have little consequence because it will not 
significantly affect the quantity or quality of the good ultimately provided. 
In such situations, the charitable deduction is likely needed to correct 
underfunding issues.  
However, the severity of the free-riding problem may change 
dramatically if direct benefits are distributed differently. Suppose one 
individual in a one-thousand member beneficiary group, T, has a very high 
preference for the good and would benefit $910 from provision of the first 
unit, $610 from provision of the second unit, and $60 from provision of the 
third unit. Assume that the remaining individuals enjoy small benefits that 
maintain the hypothetical aggregate benefits function (i.e., these 
individuals enjoy a total $90 benefit from the first unit so that the aggregate 
benefit for that unit totals $1,000, and so on). Even if all other members of 
the group fail to contribute, the good can be optimally provided if T 
donates an amount equal to his direct benefit for the two units. 
Recognizing that high-preference groups can greatly reduce collective 
action problems, economic literature suggests that T is rather likely to 
make this donation. In fact, when a so-called ―privileged group‖ exists, 
collective action problems may be eliminated entirely.
139
 A privileged 
group requires one individual (in the example above, T) to receive a benefit 
from the good or service that exceeds the total cost to provide it.
140
 The 
conditions which generally lead to free-riding are not prevalent in these 
cases because the donor‘s high preference ensures that his ―contribution [is 
not] so small in proportion to the total that it will not appreciably affect the 
amount of the good [or service] that is provided.‖141 When the high-
preference individual donates an amount roughly equal to his benefit, it 
will ―appreciably affect‖142 the funding of the good. Because the high-
preference individual has such a strong interest in the particular good or 
service provided by the donee-organization, he is likely to donate an 
amount sufficient for optimal provision. In this way, both the high-
preference donor and the other lower-preference beneficiaries can enjoy the 
                                                                                                                     
 138. Id.  
 139. See OLSON, supra note 110, at 49–50; see also HARDIN, supra note 44, at 38–42. 
 140. Mathematically, a group will be privileged if there exists an i such that Ai = Bi – C > 0, 
where Bi represents the benefits to individual i, C represents the cost to produce the public good, 
and Ai, therefore, represents the net benefits to individual i. See HARDIN, supra note 44, at 39. 
 141. Hansmann, supra note 46, at 849. 
 142. Id.  
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good or service, even if the latter group does not contribute at all.
143
 
Because underfunding is unlikely to be an issue when organizations benefit 
―privileged‖ groups, it seems economically unnecessary to subsidize these 
organizations through the charitable deduction.  
In practice, privileged groups are rare because it requires a single 
individual to have a rather strong preference for the good or service 
provided.
144
 Nonetheless, if there is a group of individuals with a 
significantly high preference for the good or service provided, economic 
literature suggests free-rider problems may be reduced even if the group is 
not ―purely‖ privileged.145 Modifying the above scenario, assume that 
instead of one high-preference individual, a group of high-preference 
individuals shares the large benefit described (for example, ten individuals 
might each benefit $91 from the first unit and $61 from the second). While 
the group is not purely privileged (no single individual‘s benefit exceeds 
the cost needed to optimally provide the two units), free-rider problems 
may still be mitigated. Because the individuals‘ combined benefit exceeds 
the total cost needed for optimal provision, the good can be optimally 
funded if each donates the ―rational‖ amount equal to his direct benefit. 
This ―quasi-privileged‖ group146 may be less susceptible to free rider 
problems than lower preference groups.
147
  
                                                                                                                     
 143. HARDIN, supra note 44, at 39 (―[I]f Ai is positive for some i, the group is privileged and 
likely to succeed.‖). 
144. Professor Russell Hardin refers to such groups as ―latent groups.‖ Id. For a real example 
of a privileged group, see Gergen, supra note 12, at 1411 (citing users of a Las Vegas television 
station purchased by billionaire magnate Howard Hughes to broadcast western and aviation films 
through the night). See also Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the 
Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 376 (2002) (discussing the use of a ―commons-based peer production‖ 
model that requires group collaboration). 
 145. More formally, this occurs when a group of high preference individuals ―just barely 
stands to benefit from providing the good [or service], even without cooperation from other[s].‖ 
HARDIN, supra note 44, at 41. In mathematical terms, if k is used to ―designate the size of any 
subgroup that just barely stands to benefit from providing the good, even without cooperation from 
other members of the whole group,‖ the group will have an increased likelihood of overcoming 
collective action problems if k is small. Id. Put another way, ―a relatively small fraction of the whole 
group would already stand to benefit . . . if that fractional subgroup alone paid the full cost of the 
group good.‖ Id. at 40–41. 
 146. Hardin calls them ―intermediate groups.‖ Id. at 40 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 147. See, e.g., id. (―[C]ommon sense suggests that there is a strong empirical relationship 
between groups‘ sizes and their prospects of failure.‖). The notion is explained:  
―Two neighbours may agree to drain a meadow, which they possess in common; 
because ‘tis easy for them to know each other‘s mind . . . . But ‘tis very 
difficult . . . that a thousand persons shou‘d agree in any such action; it being 
difficult for them to concert so complicated a design, and still more difficult for 
them to execute it . . . .‖  
Id. (quoting DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 538 (1740)). For a more complicated 
example of a latent group, see id. at 41–42.  
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With these concepts in mind, consider the three scenarios in which 
donors can be expected to enjoy direct benefits—donations made to the 
opera organization, specific church, and specific school. Literature 
suggests that the opera organization is likely to provide significant direct 
benefits to a relatively small group of high-preference beneficiaries. 
Organizations providing ―high-culture entertainment such as opera, ballet, 
and classical music,‖ have been described as having ―appeal[] only to a 
small segment of the population.‖148 The economics of such productions 
have been explained as follows:  
[T]here are seldom more than a few performances of a given 
production. The substantial start-up costs . . . account for a 
large portion of the total costs that must be spread over the 
resulting performances. Once one performance of an opera 
has been staged, the additional cost of adding another 
performance is relatively small. Similarly, so long as the 
theater is not yet filled, the additional cost incurred by adding 
another member to the audience is very small, since it costs 
little more to stage a performance for a full house than it does 
to play to one individual.  
The result is that, once a commitment has been made to 
have at least one performance of a given production, it 
becomes worthwhile to admit additional persons to the 
audience at a given performance, or to extend the number of 
performances, so long as the individuals who attend will pay a 
price just high enough to cover the small additional—
marginal—cost involved.149 
By allowing attendees to pay an admission price of their choosing (i.e., 
by making discretionary donations), productions are funded in a way that 
may not be achieved if a uniform fee were charged.
150
 Each individual is 
assumed to contribute an amount reflecting the value of the production to 
him
151
 so that a small group of donors funds the bulk of production costs 
                                                                                                                     
 148. Hansmann, supra note 46, at 856.  
 149. Id. at 856–57.  
 150. Id. at 857. 
 151. This is known in economic terms as ―price discrimination.‖ The use of this method to 
fund performances is discussed in Professor Henry Hansmann‘s seminal work, The Role of 
Nonprofit Enterprise. Id. at 857–58; see also Robert Charles Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit 
the Hospital Industry?, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1416, 1438–39 (1980) (using Hansmann‘s theory of price 
discrimination in the case of nonprofit hospitals); Jennifer Kuan, The Phantom Profits of the 
Opera: Nonprofit Ownership in the Arts as a Make-Buy Decision, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 507, 510 
(2001) (discussing voluntary price discrimination in nonprofits); Ethan G. Stone, Adhering to the 
Old Line: Uncovering the History and Political Function of the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 54 
EMORY L.J. 1475, 1539 n.212 (2005) (discussing Hansmann‘s theory of the non-distribution 
constraint and price discrimination in donor participation in nonprofit art giving).  
34
Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss4/2
2011] TOO CLOSE TO HOME 891 
 
by contributing an amount reflective of their high preferences while lower 
preference consumers need only donate enough to cover the ―marginal 
costs‖ needed to fund additional showings.152 This suggests that 
organizations such as the opera organization tend to provide goods and 
services offering significant direct benefits to a relatively small group of 
donors. Because of their high preference for the provided performances, 
these donors may be able to overcome collective action problems to fund a 
large portion of the cost needed for optimal provision.  
It seems even more likely that specific churches will provide goods and 
services to high-preference groups. Statistical data suggest that churches 
use a large portion of donations to support their own operations, such as 
maintaining and improving facilities and funding services and events.
153
 
Data also suggest ―contributions by members of churches primarily benefit 
other members.‖154 Because those who attend a specific church‘s services 
and events are generally the same individuals that make donations,
155
 
church donors can be expected to enjoy a unique array of direct benefits.  
Most obviously, a large percentage of donations will be used to 
maintain or increase the frequency and quality of services and events 
                                                                                                                     
 152. Hansmann, supra note 46, at 857. 
 153. Professor Ellen Aprill summarizes statistics related to giving to religious organizations:  
A 1972 estimate put ―‗nonsacramental‘ expenditures, those for social welfare, 
health functions, and nonreligious education,‖ at less than 20%, and available data 
indicate that ―sacramental functions account for a preponderance of church 
expenditures.‖ . . . A 2000 study by Independent Sector reported that of $9.6 
billion in donations by America‘s more than 350,000 religious congregations, 
66% was distributed within the denomination, 23% to organizations outside the 
denomination, and 11% was given in direct assistance to individuals. . . . A 1999 
survey with a nationally representative sample of congregations reported 
that . . . . [s]pending on [social service projects] . . . constituted on average only 
between 2% and 4% of a congregation‘s total budget. 
Aprill, supra note 2, at 865 (quoting CLOTFELTER, supra note 2, at 23–25). See supra note 129 
(recognizing that some donations will be used for other charitable purposes).  
 154. Aprill, supra note 2, at 865 (citing Mark Chaves, The Urban Inst., Congregations’ Social 
Service Activities, CHARTING CIVIL SOC‘Y, Dec. 1999, at 1, 2, available at 
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/cnp_6.pdf). 
 155. See Hansmann, supra note 46, at 891 (―[O]ne motivation for keeping the membership of a 
church relatively well defined is undoubtedly so that the members can be approached, and made to 
feel responsible, for contributions beyond those made during services or in the form of unsolicited 
gifts.‖). This has been explicitly recognized by some churches. See, e.g., Donations, THE RIVERSIDE 
CHURCH, http://www.theriversidechurchny.org/stewardship/?donations (last visited Apr. 6, 2011) 
(―Fulfilling the programmatic mission of The Riverside Church is made possible primarily through 
the generosity of members and friends.‖); The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, How 
Does the Church Finance Its Operations?, MORMON.ORG, http://www.mormon.org/faq/church-
operations/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2011) (―Gordon B. Hinckley, prior President of The Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints, said: ‗Our major source of revenue is the ancient law of the tithe. Our 
people are expected to pay 10 percent of their income to move forward the work of the Church.‘‖). 
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offered. Church events may extend well beyond traditional religious 
services and may provide opportunities for almost daily activity.
156
 These 
direct benefits, therefore, seem greater than those provided to ―opera 
donors‖ who are able to attend occasional performances partly funded by 
their donations.  
The donors’ ability to attend church functions and associate with 
fellow-congregants likely provides an additional “solidary benefit”157 
derived from “the act[] of associating.”158 These social benefits are unique 
to organizations where donors share relationships with other 
beneficiaries.
159
 Without seeking to quantify these benefits, recent studies 
suggest that they should not be underestimated as remote or overly 
speculative. For instance, according to a study conducted by Professors 
Robert D. Putnam of the Harvard Kennedy School and Chaeyoon Lim of 
the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the satisfaction individuals derive 
                                                                                                                     
 156. For discrete examples of churches offering an especially full variety of events, see 
Calendar of Services, GRACE CATHEDRAL, http://www.gracecathedral.org/calendar/ (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2011), offering yoga classes; Music & Events, THE RIVERSIDE CHURCH, 
http://www.theriversidechurchny.org/events/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2011), which shows a schedule of 
events including, among many other things, weekly French, yoga, and meditation classes; and 
Weekly Calendar, ST. MARK‘S EPISCOPAL CHURCH, http://www.stmarks.net/calendar/week (last 
visited Apr. 6, 2011), offering weekly yoga, meditation, and dance classes.  
 157.  Robert H. Salisbury, An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups, 13 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 1, 
20 (1969). These benefits ―include such rewards as socializing, congeniality, the sense of group 
membership and identification, the status resulting from membership, fun and conviviality, the 
maintenance of social distinctions, and so on.‖ Peter B. Clark & James Q. Wilson, Incentive 
Systems: A Theory of Organizations, 6 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 129, 134–35 (1961).  
 158.  Salisbury, supra note 157, at 16. Anthropologist Marshall D. Sahlins discussed this 
concept, stating: ―In an uncommon number of tribal transactions material utility is played down, to 
the extent that the main advantages appear to be social, the gain coming in good relations rather 
than good things.‖ MARSHALL D. SAHLINS, TRIBESMEN 9 (1968). These notions have also been 
worked into economic frameworks. See, e.g., Sobel, supra note 82, at 401–02 (discussing the way in 
which notable economists George J. Stigler and Gary S. Becker have worked these social benefits 
into their economics models which seek to determine giving.).  
 159. Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Exemption, 52 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1379, 1404 (1991) (referring to churches as ―spiritual clubhouse[s]‖). The importance 
of such relationships is something some churches have explicitly recognized. For example, the St. 
Dominic‘s Catholic Church Web site states: 
Think for a moment about what St. Dominic‘s means to you. Has St. Dominic‘s 
made a difference in your life or the life of your family? Do you have warm 
memories of Dominicans, past and present, who have served you here? Maybe you 
or your children attended St. Dominic School or St. Rose Academy, or were 
baptized or married here. Maybe you were inspired by the church‘s soaring Gothic 
beauty, or made lasting friendships through our peer community groups or our 
many volunteer ministries.  
Planned Giving, ST. DOMINIC‘S CATHOLIC CHURCH, http://www.stdominics.org/donations/planned 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2011). 
36
Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss4/2
2011] TOO CLOSE TO HOME 893 
 
from attending church and other religious organizations may be largely 
attributable to these “social aspects.”160  
In light of this, it seems likely that churches provide a rather unique 
array of direct benefits and are, therefore, likely to offer goods and services 
to high-preference beneficiaries. This suggests that these groups may be 
able to overcome collective action problems to donate in a “rational” 
manner, reducing underfunding problems.
161
 A similar analysis would 
likely apply to donations made to specific schools. It seems likely that a 
relatively small group of parents would value the education of their own 
children so highly that they would happily donate large amounts to their 
children‘s school, providing benefits both to their children and to other 
students.
162
  
                                                                                                                     
 160. See Chaeyoon Lim & Robert D. Putnam, Religion, Social Networks, and Life Satisfaction, 
75 AM. SOC. REV. 914, 927 (2010).  
[In part,] Lim and Putnam find that the connection between happiness and religion 
is not a result of theology (what you believe and what religion you belong to) or 
private religious practices (e.g., frequency of prayer or feeling God‘s presence in 
one‘s life). Instead, they find that frequent churchgoers are more satisfied with 
their lives because they build intimate social networks in their congregations, 
anchoring a strong sense of belonging in these religious communities and 
receiving morally-infused social support.  
Media Abstract of Professor Lim and Putnam‘s Article, AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV., 
http://asr.sagepub.com/content/suppl/2010/12/10/75.6.914.DC1/ASR386686_mediaab.pdf (last 
visited May 9, 2011). In describing their findings, Professor Lim stated: 
―We show that [life satisfaction] is almost entirely about the social aspect of 
religion, rather than the theological or spiritual aspect . . . . We found that people 
are more satisfied with their lives when they go to church, because they build a 
social network within their congregation.  
. . . . 
―We think it has something to do with the fact that you meet a group of close 
friends on a regular basis, together as a group, and participate in certain activities 
that are meaningful to the group . . . . At the same time, they share a certain social 
identity, a sense of belonging to a moral faith community. The sense of belonging 
seems to be the key to the relationship between church attendance and life 
satisfaction.‖  
Stephanie Pappas, Why Religion Makes People Happier (Hint: Not God), LIVESCIENCE (Dec. 6, 
2010, 10:32 PM), http://www.livescience.com/9090-religion-people-happier-hint-god.html 
(quoting Professor Lim). 
 161. This Article is not the first to suggest that churches may not be severely underfunded. 
See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 12, at 1394–95 (arguing that allowing the charitable deduction when 
donors contribute ― to churches is not justified as a subsidy because churches do not seem to suffer 
greatly from freeriding and so should not be underfunded,‖ while reserving the possibility that it 
might be justified on other grounds).  
 162. This Author recognizes that the analysis is more nuanced in this situation. A parent will 
experience direct benefits from her child being better educated. Her child may, for instance, have 
greater earning potential and be able to care for her in the future. But most of the benefits the 
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In sum, it is likely that many individuals that donate to the opera, 
church, and school experience direct benefits. Further, because each 
organization is likely to provide significant direct benefits to high-
preference groups, there is an increased likelihood that these beneficiaries 
will overcome collective action problems to fund a sizeable portion of the 
cost needed to optimally fund goods and services. It is important, however, 
to fully understand the implications of these observations. While high-
preference groups may contribute a large percentage of the needed amount, 
these donations may not completely cover all costs.
163
 For instance, while 
high-preference groups may fund the bulk of the opera organization‘s start 
up costs, the smaller donations of low-preference beneficiaries may still be 
needed to fund additional productions.
164
 Similarly, while high-preference 
donors may fund the bulk of the cost needed to optimally fund churches 
and schools, there is certainly no guarantee these donations will cover all 
expenses. Thus, while underfunding problems may be far less severe in 
these cases, they may not be completely eliminated simply because a high-
preference group exists.
165
  
                                                                                                                     
parent-donor will experience are probably best categorized as the internalized benefits of her child. 
The parent might, for instance, internalize a substantial portion of the benefits of his being better 
educated, the benefits of his being able to enjoy improved or additional facilities, and the ―solidarity 
benefits‖ her child might experience by being able to associate with classmates who are also able to 
enjoy these things. To be precise, one may want to characterize these internalized benefits as quasi-
direct benefits and be clear that it is these benefits that lead to the presence of high-preference 
groups. However, it seems unnecessary to fully explore this point to illustrate the basic similarities 
of the church and school donations.  
 163. Thus, the group does not meet the definition of a true quasi-privileged (or intermediate) 
group, which requires a group of individuals whose combined benefits exceed total costs. See supra 
notes 143–46 and accompanying text. 
 164. See supra notes 149–55 and accompanying text.  
 165. Close consideration of the optimal subsidization model reveals further reason why this 
might be so. In the numerical scenarios above, the optimal subsidization level was held constant 
(i.e., the examples used a ―fixed‖ aggregate benefit function). This was useful to illustrate how 
collective action problems might be minimized when organizations provided goods and services 
that significantly benefited small groups of potential donors. However, the presence of a high-
preference group may itself change the optimal subsidization level.  
Recall the example above where one thousand individuals enjoyed slight benefits. Using the 
assumed cost function, it was optimal for two units to be provided. See supra Part V.A.1. In the 
immediately following example, a high-preference individual was introduced, but the aggregate 
benefit function was held constant so that the optimal subsidization level remained unchanged. 
Assume, however, that aggregate benefits are no longer held constant and that in addition to the one 
thousand low-preference beneficiaries described there is a high-preference individual T that would 
enjoy $910 benefit from the first unit of the good, $610 benefit from the second unit, and a $60 
benefit from the third. Because T has such a high preference for the good, he may pay enough for 
two units to be provided even without the contributions of the low-preference beneficiaries. See 
supra Part V.A.1. This is significant—without the existence of this high preference donor, 
collective action problems may well prevent the funding of these units. Nonetheless, the optimal 
subsidization level will increase because one must account for T‘s high preference. It is now 
optimal for an additional third unit to be provided. However, a donation equal to T‘s direct benefit 
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Suppose, for instance, that a high-preference group would provide 
donations to cover 90% of the costs needed for a donee-organization to 
optimally provide a particular good or service. The remaining 
―underfunding gap‖ (the 10% of costs not donated) may be filled if the 
remaining low-preference beneficiaries ―rationally‖ contribute an amount 
equal to their smaller benefits. This is unlikely to occur if the donee-
organization can use the donations of high-preference donors to provide a 
substantial (albeit sub-optimal) quantity of the good or service. In these 
cases, low-preference donors may be content to enjoy amounts provided 
cost free.
166
 However, this ―lingering collective action problem‖ may be 
overcome (and the underfunding gap narrowed or eliminated) if the good 
or service cannot be provided in divisible units.  
2.  Assessing Underfunding Problems Based on the ―Lumpy‖ Nature 
of Direct Benefits 
Suppose that a donee-organization must collect a set amount before it 
can construct the most minimally adequate facility to suit its purposes and 
that a high preference group has provided donations to cover 90% of this 
figure. Low-preference donors cannot rely on enjoying the portion of the 
facility constructed with these ―high-preference‖ donations because 
construction cannot commence until total donations cover needed costs. 
Because every donation has increased significance,
167
 low-preference 
beneficiaries may no longer perceive their contributions to be ―so small in 
proportion to the total that it will not appreciably affect the amount of the 
good . . . provided.‖168  
In economic parlance, a good that cannot be provided in continuous 
increments but must instead be provided in total or not at all is called a 
―step good.‖169 Economists have recognized that when these goods are 
provided, free-rider problems may be eliminated under certain conditions. 
Specifically, where ―other members of [a] group have already contributed 
the bulk of the cost of a step good . . . an individual might stand to benefit 
more from final supply of the good than the additional increment required 
for its provision.‖170 In other words, in these situations low-preference 
                                                                                                                     
($1,580) is not sufficient to cover the total costs of three units. Thus, while T‘s high-preference 
donation funds a large portion of the cost needed for optimal provision, an ―underfunding gap‖ 
may remain.  
 166. See supra notes 136–38 (describing conditions likely to lead to free-riding).   
 167. HARDIN, supra note 44, at 55–56 (explaining conditions that must exist for the good to be 
provided).  
 168. Hansmann, supra note 46, at 849. 
 169. HARDIN, supra note 44, at 50 (stating that scholars often assume that ―the collective good 
[can] be supplied at varying levels,‖ but that this may not be correct). A step good can also be 
described as a good whose provision is binary. Id. at 55. 
 170. HARDIN, supra note 44, at 57. In this scenario, there may be ―numerous local regions in 
which noncontribution is not the preferred strategy for an individual.‖ Id. For a more complicated 
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beneficiaries may overcome lingering collective action problems and 
donate the ―rational‖ amount (equal to their small direct benefits) to ensure 
that the good or service is provided.  
This has important implications for the ―high preference‖ organizations 
discussed—the opera organization, church, and school. As discussed, a 
high-preference donor group may cover a large portion of the costs needed 
to optimally fund the goods and services provided by these donee-
organizations. With the ―bulk of the cost‖171 covered, lingering collective 
action problems may be reduced or eliminated if the provided goods or 
services are sufficiently ―lumpy.‖172 Each of the ―high preference‖ 
organizations seems capable of providing goods and services possessing 
some of these qualities. One would not, for instance, expect the opera 
organization to stage an increment of a production or a church to hold a 
fraction of a mass. While the quality of these goods and services might 
vary according to the total funds ultimately collected, a threshold amount 
must be donated before an additional performance or religious service 
could be held. Larger projects seem even ―lumpier‖ in nature. For instance, 
churches sometimes establish ―building funds‖ that set aside donated 
amounts for the construction of designated projects, such as new places for 
congregating and holding services.
173
 Schools also establish similar funds 
explicitly designating donated amounts toward the construction or 
improvement of particular facilities, such as gymnasiums, libraries, or 
technology classrooms.
174
 Again, while quality might vary with total 
                                                                                                                     
example, see id. at 56.  
 171. Id. at 57. 
 172. Gergen, supra note 12, at 1411 (using this term ―lumpy‖ or ―step‖ goods). 
 173. See, e.g., Battle Lake Baptist Church Building Fund, BATTLE LAKE CMTY. BAPTIST 
CHURCH, http://www.battlelakechurch.ca/buildingfund.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2011); ST. 
NICHOLAS RUSS. ORTHODOX CHURCH, http://www.orthodox.net/aboutus/building-fund.html (last 
visited Apr. 6, 2011); Donations, ST. DOMINIC‘S CATH. CHURCH, 
http://www.stdominics.org/donations (last visited Apr. 6, 2011) (―Your gift to the Saving God’s 
House Appeal will help us to complete the restoration of the church‘s glorious stained glass 
windows and exterior masonry, and to undertake other projects such as cleaning of the interior 
walls, polishing of the altars, carvings, and statues, and refinishing of the pews, kneelers, and 
floors.‖); Make a Donation, PENTECOSTAL TEMPLE COGIC, http://pentecostal-
temple.org/aboutus.aspx (last visited Apr. 6, 2011); A Wondrous Gift is Given, HOLY APOSTLES 
ORTHODOX CHURCH, http://www.holyapostlesorthodoxchurch.org/fundraising.html (last visited Apr. 
24, 2011) (―The wonderful news has probably traveled to most of you, that the Lord has given our 
parish a beautiful temple, the historic St. Joseph’s cemetery church. . . . With the Lord’s help we 
will need to raise $1,000,000.00 to cover the costs of the restoration/renovation. Additional funds 
will be needed for the beautification of the church, and to build a parish hall (we estimate another 
$1,000,000.00.) [sic] We have begun fund-raising efforts, and welcome any ideas or suggestions for 
ways to raise the funds. To all of our brothers and sisters in Christ, please keep us in your prayers as 
we begin this process.”).  
 174. See, e.g., Class Wishlist—Donate to the Classroom, JOINT SCH. DIST. NO. 2 EDUC. 
FOUND., http://www.meridianschools.org/Community/EducationFoundation/DonateToTheClass 
room/Lists/Class%20Wishlist/Opened.aspx (last visited Apr. 6, 2011). This Web site displays 
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contributions, the organization must first collect a certain amount before 
construction can reasonably commence. While it is certainly not claimed 
that these goods or services meet the pure definition of a ―step‖ good, they 
seem to possess lumpy characteristics. 
When lumpy goods like these are provided, lingering collective action 
problems may be reduced if low-preference donors believe their donations 
have consequence
175—that is, if these donors understand that there is a 
meaningful ―relationship between the size of [their] contribution[s] and the 
amount of the good [they] enjoy[].‖176 However, unless low-preference 
beneficiaries are provided the information needed to make this assessment, 
the lingering collective action problem will persist. This is exemplified by 
voter behavior in political elections, ―the most renowned of all genuine 
step good collective actions . . . .‖177 A candidate‘s election is a step good, 
as one‘s favored candidate either wins or loses the contest. However, this 
fact alone may have little impact on a citizen‘s willingness to vote (i.e., 
                                                                                                                     
teachers‘ ―wishlist‖ items along with prices for those items. Donors may select to donate amounts 
to fund those particular items. Id. The Web site states:  
Do you have a specific school, project or teacher you would like to help? You can 
make a donation to the Foundation and we will disperse the funds according to 
your wishes. If you are a teacher, you can even direct a contribution right to your 
own classroom. We just have to make sure it‘s for an approved, educational use. 
We take care of the bookkeeping and you get the tax benefit of contributing to a 
not-for-profit 501(c)(3) organization.  
Support Us, JOINT SCH. DIST. NO. 2 EDUC. FOUND., http://www.meridian 
schools.org/Community/EducationFoundation/Pages/SupportUs.aspx (last visited Apr. 6, 2011). 
For another example of such a fund, see Jeremy Mayo, Miazga’s Donate $250,000 to RHS 
Improvements, Gym to be Renamed in Honor, HODAGSPORTS.COM (Jan. 15, 2011), 
http://www.hodagsports.com/stories.html?SKU=20110114161615. The Web site reports that the 
school has already collected a substantial portion of the money needed to fulfill the  
$1 million capital campaign program by the Hodag Facilities Foundation to make 
improvements to Rhinelander High School. . . . The capital campaign is targeted to 
improve and enhance facilities with private money beyond the referendum 
projects. These facility improvements include ceiling upgrades in the auditorium, a 
brand new digital media center, lighting and tiling in the pool, a new science lab, 
and enhancements in the gymnasium. 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Hodag Facilities Foundation is a 501(c)(3). Fast Facts, 
HODAG FACILITIES FOUND., http://www.hodagfacilities.com/fastfacts.html (last visited Apr. 6, 
2011).Taxpayers are encouraged to purchase ―pavers‖ (bricks) with their names inscribed. 2011 
Paver Sale, HODAG FACILITIES FOUND., http://www.hodagfacilities.com/ paver.html (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2011). 
 175. In other words, it is no longer the case that ―the individual‘s contribution is likely to be so 
small in proportion to the total that it will not appreciably affect the amount of the good that is 
provided . . . .‖ Hansmann, supra note 46, at 849. 
 176. Id. 
 177. HARDIN, supra note 44, at 59. 
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donate), as he often lacks the information needed to assess whether his 
vote will be of any particular import.
178
 In this way, citizens routinely fail 
to vote because ―the fact that some contribution [i.e., vote] might make [a] 
difference . . . is discounted by the low probability that a particular [vote] 
will be the one that makes the difference.‖179  
Thus, lingering collective action problems will be reduced only if low-
preference beneficiaries can assess the probable influence of their 
donations. Perhaps most importantly, these individuals must be aware that 
others have contributed the ―bulk of the cost‖180 needed to fund the lumpy 
good, assuring them that their small contributions will significantly 
increase the probability of the good‘s provision. Intuitively, this 
information can be most easily provided for larger projects
181
 when the 
donee-organization is able to identify likely donors and, therefore, 
effectively target communications. Because schools and churches can 
focus communication efforts on parents and congregants
182
 these 
organizations should have little trouble providing needed information.
183
 It 
might be more difficult for the opera organization to cost-effectively 
provide needed information because the identity of potential donors 
(particularly low-preference donors) may not be as clear.
184
  
3.  Summary of Direct Benefit Analysis 
In sum, when those who directly benefit from the goods or services 
provided by donee-organizations are economically rational and financially 
capable of donating, goods and services should not be underfunded. In 
these cases, the charitable deduction is economically unnecessary. 
However, collective action problems may cause direct beneficiaries to stray 
from the rational donor model, resulting in underfunding.  
This Part has shown that free-rider problems can be partly overcome 
                                                                                                                     
 178. Id. (referring to elections as ―a game with, at best, poor communication . . . that . . . can be 
seen as a one-shot rather than an ongoing game‖).  
 179. Id. at 60.  
 180. Id. at 57.  
 181. It would, for instance, seem impractical for a church to ―advertise‖ the remaining 
amount needed to fund smaller projects, such as an additional church service. Thus, even though 
services may be somewhat lumpy in nature, it seems unlikely that this will solve lingering collective 
action problems. However, as discussed in the remaining Parts, there are other reasons to believe 
that church services will not be significantly underfunded.  
 182. In this vein, Professor Hansmann has surmised ―one motivation for keeping the 
membership of a church relatively well defined is undoubtedly so that the members can be 
approached, and made to feel responsible, for contributions beyond those made during services or 
in the form of unsolicited gifts.‖ Hansmann, supra note 46, at 891. 
 183. In fact, schools and churches already provide this information in some fund-raising efforts 
by specifying a goal amount needed to fund a particular project and providing update on progress 
being made. See supra notes 173–74 and accompanying text regarding churches and school 
wishlists.  
 184. The maintenance of lists of past donors might aid in this task.  
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when organizations provide goods or services that offer significant direct 
benefits to high preference individuals. In these cases, the group is 
increasingly likely to overcome collective action problems and donate a 
large portion of needed costs. Because the opera organization, church, and 
school are likely to provide goods and services to high-preference 
beneficiaries, underfunding may not be particularly severe in these cases.  
Nonetheless, low-preference donors may be required to contribute if 
optimal provision is to be fully achieved. In many cases, this will not occur 
because of lingering collective action problems. However, when 
organizations are able to provide lumpy goods, low-preference donors may 
overcome free-rider issues. As shown, the opera organization, the church, 
and the school all seem to provide goods with lumpy characteristics, but 
churches and schools likely possess a superior ability to communicate 
needed information. Because of this ability, when churches and schools 
seek to fund large projects that seem extremely lumpy (such as the 
construction of new or improved facilities) there is reason to believe that 
underfunding issues may be minimal. In these final cases, it becomes rather 
difficult to use efficiency concepts to justify the charitable deduction and 
the tax subsidy may be economically unnecessary.  
Of course, this identifies a very discrete set of circumstances. To 
proceed with an analysis of the hypothetical donations, this Part turns to 
giving benefits, the next variable in the rational donor model.  
B.  Giving Benefits 
It is useful to remind the reader of the way giving benefits—benefits 
derived from the act of giving itself
185—factor into the analysis. In some 
cases, high-preference groups may fund a bulk of the cost needed for 
optimal provision by donating an amount equal to their direct benefit but 
an underfunding gap may remain. This gap may be (at least partially) filled 
if high-preference donors contribute an amount exceeding their direct 
benefits. Recalling the rational donor model, this may occur if, in addition 
to their direct benefits, high preference beneficiaries experience giving 
benefits, internalized benefits, or a combination of the two.
186
 The gap may 
also be (at least partially) filled if low-preference beneficiaries donate. 
                                                                                                                     
 185. See Andreoni, supra note 79, at 1448–49 (―[P]eople get some private goods benefit from 
their gift per se, like a warm glow.‖). 
 186.  It is important to remind the reader that this analysis depends on the assumptions made to 
develop the optimal subsidization model, which disregarded internalized and giving benefits to 
eliminate what were referred to as subsidization biases. Under these assumptions, goods are 
considered optimally provided for purposes of this Article when produced up to the point where the 
sum of the direct benefit enjoyed by the donor and the benefits enjoyed by non-donors exceed the 
costs of production. This Article purposefully excluded internalized benefits and the warm glow 
effect from this latter determination. See supra note 100. Without these assumptions in place, the 
increase in these benefits would increase the amount the donor would be willing to donate but 
would also increase the optimal subsidization level, and the below analysis would change.  
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Where a high-preference group exists but the lingering collective action 
problem remains, low-preference beneficiaries may fail to contribute 
because they are content to enjoy goods and services funded by others. 
However, because giving benefits are (by definition) derived from the act 
of giving itself, one cannot enjoy such benefits by free-riding.
187
 A donor 
cannot, for instance, ―feel good‖ about helping fund his neighborhood park 
unless he actually makes a contribution.
188
 Thus, if low-preference 
beneficiaries enjoy giving benefits, they may donate some amount 
regardless of their tendency to free-ride.  
In other cases, where a high-preference group is unlikely to exist, 
donors will not enjoy significant direct benefits. Thus, donations will be 
largely dependent on giving and internalized benefits, the remaining 
benefits potentially available to the donor under the rational donor 
model.
189
 The analysis will proceed by discussing giving benefits and 
internalized benefits in turn.  
There are various types of giving benefits.
190
 A donor may enjoy 
―warm glow‖ benefits if he experiences satisfaction for being the 
―instrument‖ of giving.191 For instance, a donor may not only be pleased 
that a specific group or organization benefited from his contribution but 
may also be pleased that he was personally able to make this happen.
192
 
Additionally, a donor may experience ―reputational enhancement‖ 
because of his gift.
193
 As explored by Economist Gertrud M. Fleming and 
Judge Richard A. Posner, the act of giving may improve the donor‘s status 
by ―signaling‖ altruism ―to the people with whom [he has] or seek[s] to 
                                                                                                                     
 187.  As Professor James Andreoni puts it, ―people get some private goods benefit from the gift 
per se, like a warm glow.‖ Andreoni, supra note 79, at 1448–49; see Temimi, supra note 104, at 1 
(discussing whether warm-glow mitigates or exacerbates inefficiency).  
 188. As Andreoni explains, when individuals enjoy such benefits, ―giving by others is no 
longer a perfect substitute‖ for the act of giving. Andreoni, supra note 79, at 1451. 
 189. See supra Part IV. 
 190. Some of the giving benefits discussed might also be construed as direct benefits but have 
been purposefully characterized in this way because they represent benefits non-donors cannot 
enjoy by free-riding. See supra note 187 accompanying text. 
 191. Colombo, supra note 28, at 672–73. 
 192. See Benkler, supra note 144, at 375–76 (using similar examples to study the nature of 
giving and discussing the ―common-based-peer production‖ model, which requires group 
collaboration); Colombo, supra note 28, at 672–73 (describing a gift from husband to wife, wherein 
the husband derives pleasure from being able to increase his wife‘s happiness); John P. Conley & 
Fan-chin Kung, Private Benefits, Warm Glow, and Reputation in the Free and Open Source 
Software Production Model, 12 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 665, 668 (2010) (providing an example of 
pure giving benefits in which, ―Software engineers contribute code to . . . projects simply because 
they enjoy writing code; they take pleasure in the act of production itself. In economic terms, this is 
a manifestation of ‗warm glow.‘ . . . The idea is that the act of contributing is its own reward. This is 
not influenced by the desire to consume the public good itself or by the level of contributions others 
make.‖). 
 193. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
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have interactions.‖194 This requires the donor‘s gift to be ―visible‖ to those 
with whom he shares existing or desired relationships.
195
 Put another way, 
in order for a donor to experience status benefits, a ―third party audience‖ 
must not only be made aware of the donor‘s contribution, but the donor 
must ―care about the inferences drawn by [these] third parties.‖196 The 
ability to enjoy reputational enhancement may be further increased if the 
donor shares ongoing (as opposed to more temporary or fleeting) 
relationships with this ―audience.‖197 When interactions are continuing—
that is, when actors operate in what economists call ―repeated games‖ or 
―supergames‖198—there are more opportunities for reputational 
enhancement. ―In a repeated interaction . . . . [i]ndividuals forgo their 
short-term selfish gains because being nice . . . will lead to nice treatment 
in the future.‖199 Thus, a donor who has continuing interactions with other 
donors and beneficiaries may be willing to donate more than he otherwise 
would in order to increase his reputation with these individuals.  
It seems that donors contributing to the toy organization will enjoy 
rather limited giving benefits. Presumably, donors will not share 
                                                                                                                     
 194. Fremling & Posner, supra note 82, at 2. The authors seek to develop  
a framework that considers future opportunities for social or economic interaction 
and so the incentive for signaling behavior. An individual will often forgo small 
immediate economic gains to protect or enhance his future opportunities. The 
perfectly rational motive to portray oneself as an economically well-off, caring 
person can have a multitude of interesting consequences for market behavior. 
Id.; see Sobel, supra note 82, at 392 (explaining that individuals will often be willing to 
―[r]espond[] to kindness with kindness in order to sustain a profitable long-term relationship or to 
obtain a (profitable) reputation for being a reliable associate‖). 
 195. Fremling & Posner, supra note 82, at 5 (arguing that reputational enhancement cannot 
occur if donors are ―anonymous,‖ as, ―[T]here is little room for signaling personal 
characteristics . . . if one is invisible to . . . the transaction.‖). 
196. Id. at 6. Fremling and Posner provide a market-based example: ―Attending a public 
auction in a small town (or shopping in a small town in a store where one is constantly bumping 
into one‘s neighbors and friends, who observe one‘s purchasing in the store) involves more 
signaling to third parties than participating in a similar auction on the internet.‖ Id. 
 197. According to Professor Joel Sobel, ―In order for conventional repeated-game arguments 
to apply, the future must be important. Agents must be patient and there must be opportunities to 
reward and punish today‘s behavior. When these conditions fail, theory predicts a return to myopic 
selfish behavior.‖ Sobel, supra note 82, at 411.  
 198. For a seminal work on the topic, see generally James W. Friedman, A Non-cooperative 
Equilibrium for Supergames, 38 REV. ECON. STUD. 1 (1971). 
 199. Sobel, supra note 82, at 411. Sobel refers to these benefits as ―reciprocal‖ benefits. 
―Responding to kindness with kindness in order to sustain a profitable long-term relationship or to 
obtain a (profitable) reputation for being a reliable associate are examples of instrumental 
reciprocity.‖ Id. at 392 (emphasis omitted). The concepts presented above regarding reputational 
benefits, repeated games, and reciprocal benefits are considered distinct from one another but are 
treated together in this Article as they represent the same idea that individuals might derive benefits 
from giving when certain relationships exist. 
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relationships with the children-beneficiaries or personally witness their 
enjoyment. In this case, the donor‘s ―warm glow‖ benefits would be 
limited to those derived from the general knowledge that he has helped 
unknown children.
200
 Recognizing this, the toy organization may attempt to 
―create‖ a connection by providing donors with photographs, letters, and 
other similar items that supply personal information about beneficiaries.
201
 
If this is done, ―toy donors‖ may at least experience some ―warm glow‖ 
benefit from their donation.  
The ways in which the toy donor may enjoy reputational enhancement 
also seem limited. In order for the donor to experience this benefit, 
individuals with whom the donor hopes to have future relationships must 
know of the donor‘s gift.202 The donor might enjoy status benefits if, for 
instance, the toy organization provided promotional material revealing the 
donor‘s generosity to a ―third party audience‖ whose opinion mattered to 
the donor.
203
 While by no means impossible, the opportunities for 
significant reputational enhancement seem somewhat remote.  
Donors (particularly high-preference donors) contributing to the opera 
organization may enjoy more significant giving benefits. A high-preference 
donor may experience a ―warm glow‖ by helping to fund an art form she 
values highly and by providing others who could not otherwise attend the 
opera with the opportunity to do so.
204
 While the donor is unlikely to share 
any future relationship with these other audience member-beneficiaries—
i.e., these individuals are unlikely to share ongoing relationships—the 
donor will at least have the opportunity to attend performances and witness 
some of these benefits. Further and perhaps more importantly, because 
desired groups are more likely to be informed of (particularly high-
                                                                                                                     
 200.  See Hansmann, supra note 46, at 851 (discussing the monitoring problem faced by certain 
nonprofits when there is ―no observable connection between the amount of the individual‘s 
contribution and the quality of the [product]‖); see also Atkinson, supra note 61, at 531 (arguing 
some attenuated benefits to the donor, beyond the mere psychological, may have to be ignored); 
Mark Pauly & Michael Redisch, The Not-For-Profit Hospital as a Physicians’ Cooperative, 63 AM. 
ECON. REV. 87, 98 (1973) (―These contributions could be motivated by a desire on the part of 
contributors to make output available to themselves or to those whom they would like to see 
consume it. That is, the motivation could either be based on the potential receipt of private benefits 
or of external benefits.‖).  
 201. This is something which organizations serving the needy often do. See, e.g., 
Sponsor a Child, FEED THE CHILDREN, http://www.feedthechildren.org/site/PageServer?pagena 
me=org_child_sponsorship (last visited Apr. 6, 2011) (providing a means to allow donors ―to 
personally connect with children in need . . . . As a monthly sponsor, you will receive a photo and 
personal profile of the child you are sponsoring . . . and notes, drawings or correspondence from 
your child once a year.‖).  
 202. Fremling & Posner, supra note 82, at 2, 5. 
 203.  Id. at 6. 
 204. See supra Part V.A.1 (discussing economics of opera productions and the importance of 
high-preference donations to fund a bulk of costs so that lower preference consumers need only 
fund marginal costs).  
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preference) donors‘ gifts, there are increased opportunities for reputational 
enhancement. Consider the program established by the Metropolitan 
Opera, which provides for various levels of ―[g]uild membership.‖205 Each 
level of membership is increasingly expensive to purchase but, in turn, 
offers increased access to priority seating, back stage tours, dress 
rehearsals, and other similar privileges.
206
 This provides a way for the 
donor‘s contribution to become ―visible.‖207 For instance, a donor who sits 
in the opera hall‘s most desirable seats may be able to ―signal‖ to fellow-
opera attendees and aficionados that he has made the requisite donation 
allowing access. Whether and to what extent this will result in a particular 
donor enjoying reputational enhancement depends on whether and to what 
extent each particular donor values the opinions of this created ―third party 
audience.‖208  
Finally, many church and school donors can be expected to enjoy rather 
substantial giving benefits as a result of their gifts. These donors may 
experience rather significant ―warm glow‖ benefits by helping support 
donee-organizations that play an important role in their lives and by being 
able to help other beneficiaries with whom they share continuing 
relationships—fellow-congregants (in the case of church donations) and 
the donor‘s children, his child‘s classmates, and their families (in the case 
of school donations).
209
 Further, the opportunities for reputational 
enhancement may increase significantly in these cases (as compared to the 
other cases) because the relationship between the donor and the 
beneficiaries of his donation is likely an ongoing one.
 210
 Because church 
and school donors will have ―repeated interactions‖ with other donors and 
beneficiaries, giving generously is more likely to result in valuable status 
benefits.
211
  
To summarize these preliminary observations,
212
 because the toy 
                                                                                                                     
 205. Guild Membership Levels, THE METROPOLITAN OPERA, http://www.metoperafamily.org/ 
metopera/support/membership_patron/guild_membership/levels.aspx (last visited Apr. 6, 2011). 
Importantly, a fraction of the cost will not be deductible, as set forth on the Web site. For instance, 
according to the Web site, for those who donate $1,750 for the highest level of membership, $1,710 
is deductible and $40 is not deductible. Id. See generally also Melanie Leslie, The Wisdom of 
Crowds? Groupthink and Nonprofit Governance, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1179, 1187 n.27 (2010) 
(discussing the private benefit doctrine in relation to charities).  
 206. Guild Membership Levels, supra note 205. 
 207. See Fremling & Posner, supra note 82, at 2. 
 208. Id. at 6.  
 209. See supra Part V.A.1. 
 210. And these beneficiaries will, in turn, be a readily accessible ―third party audience.‖ 
Fremling & Posner, supra note 82, at 6. 
 211. See Sobel, supra note 82, at 397, 411, 420.  
 212. Because there is somewhat conflicting evidence regarding giving benefits, this Part seeks 
only to provide preliminary observations and recognizes that further empirical evidence must tease 
out the more difficult question of when these benefits exist. Professors John P. Conley and Fan-chin 
Kung explain: ―There are [several] areas at least that merit deeper study. The first is modeling more 
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organization offers only slight direct benefits and limited giving benefits, it 
will likely suffer severe underfunding problems unless donors internalize a 
large portion of the benefits of other beneficiaries.
213
 In the other three 
high-preferences cases, giving benefits may narrow the ―underfunding gap‖ 
by causing low-preference donors to provide some contribution and by 
causing high-preference donors to make donations exceeding their direct 
benefits. This underfunding gap may be further reduced or eliminated if 
donors also enjoy internalized benefits, the final benefit in the rational 
donor model.  
C.  Internalized Benefits 
As discussed in Part IV.C, when donors experience internalized 
benefits they, in essence, make the benefits of others ―their own.‖214 The 
extent to which this occurs depends on the extent to which the donor‘s 
utility function is interdependent with that of other beneficiaries.
215
 As also 
illustrated, underfunding may occur because donors do not adequately 
internalize the benefits of others, referred to as the externality problem. In 
assessing the relative likelihood that donors will internalize benefits (and 
                                                                                                                     
explicitly the details of how and why contributors benefit from reputation. . . . Games of status and 
gifting economies are also understudied in the context of voluntary contributions.‖ Conley & Kung, 
supra note 192, at 683. To read an explanation of the difficulty of studying these motivations, see 
generally Cagri S. Kumru & Lise Vesterlund, The Effect of Status on Voluntary Contribution, 12 J. 
Pub. Econ. Theory 709 (2010). One transnational research team noted: 
It is difficult if not impossible to use field data to determine the extent to which 
individuals are willing to invest in resources to improve their status aside from 
potential (eventual) financial remuneration, and how this behavior is affected by 
the conditions in which status can be improved. Survey data have trouble 
identifying status-seeking activities and since they cannot precisely delineate 
reference groups, it is difficult to know to whom individuals compare themselves.  
Gary Charness et al., Competitive Preferences and Status as an Incentive: Experimental Evidence 2 
(CIRANO Scientific Publications 2011s-07, 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1752213. The team sought to overcome these 
obstacles: ―By controlling the environment and the composition of the reference group, 
experimental methods offer the possibility of directly evaluating the individual‘s willingness to 
invest in status seeking.‖ Id. Further, because giving benefits will generally be small in comparison 
to direct and internalized benefits, their discussion, while significant, need not be quite as 
comprehensive. See Conley & Kung, supra note 192, at 672 (―Agents tend to be motivated to 
contribute more by the Personal Benefits they get from consuming the correspondingly higher 
levels of public good that their own contributions produce than a desire to receive credit for these 
contributions. Of course, agents are still partially motivated by Warm Glow.‖). 
 213. Even if the toy organization were able to ―create‖ increased warm glow benefits by 
providing pictures, letters, and other personal items, this benefit alone is exceedingly unlikely to 
cause donors to contribute an amount sufficient for optimal provision.  
 214. See supra Part IV.C.  
 215. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.  
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the relative severity of the externality problem)
216
 in the four hypothetical 
donations, the first point is somewhat intuitive: internalized benefits will 
increase (and externality problems will be less severe) as the relationship 
between donors and potential beneficiaries becomes more substantial.
217
 
The externality problem is, therefore, likely to be rather severe for the 
toy organization. The only feasible relationship shared by donors and the 
beneficiary-children is one ―created‖ by the organization‘s possible 
provision of personal letters or photographs.
218
 As a result, the respective 
utility functions of donors and beneficiaries will likely be largely 
independent and donors will generally be unlikely to adequately internalize 
the children‘s benefits.219 Putting the analysis together, because toy donors 
are unlikely to enjoy any significant benefits from their donations, the toy 
organization is likely to suffer rather severe underfunding problems.  
The externality problem is also likely to be rather severe for the opera 
organization.
 
While several fellow-opera lovers might share a relationship 
with one another, there is no reason to think that potential donors share 
significant ongoing relationships with many potential audience members 
(the beneficiaries of their donations). Internalized benefits are, therefore, 
unlikely to have a significant impact on a donor‘s willingness to contribute.  
Thus, while high-preference opera donors will enjoy significant direct 
benefits from their donations (which may reduce collective action 
problems) and may also enjoy giving benefits (further reducing any 
remaining ―underfunding gap‖), the externality problem may remain 
severe. As a result, the opera organization may still suffer mild to moderate 
underfunding problems.  
The externality analysis is rather different for the final two cases. The 
utility functions of church donors and their fellow congregants will almost 
certainly be somewhat interdependent, as these individuals will share a 
(sometimes rather significant) relationship.
220
 A similar analysis may apply 
                                                                                                                     
 216. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 217.  See supra note 98. 
 218. See supra Part V.B. 
 219.  Cf. Hansmann, supra note 46, at 847. Where there is a great ―separation between the 
[donor] and the [beneficiaries],‖ it seems likely that market failure will occur. Id. As discussed 
supra note 213, if the toy organization provides pictures, letters, and other personal documents, 
some relationship may be ―created,‖ which could, in turn, lead to some internalized benefits.  
 220. See, e.g., Core Values, FRIENDSHIP CMTY. CHURCH, 
http://www.friendshipcommunity.org/#/About/Core%20Values (last visited Apr. 6, 2011) (―Core 
Values[:] . . . . People are more important than things. . . . We build each other up and encourage 
the Church‘s leaders and workers.‖); FRIENDSHIP CHURCH, http://friendshipchurchsa.org/index.htm 
(last visited Apr. 6, 2011) (―Where New & Old Friends Love to Meet!‖ (emphasis added)); Planned 
Giving, supra note 159 (―Think for a moment about what St. Dominic‘s means to you. Has St. 
Dominic‘s made a difference in your life or the life of your family? Do you have warm memories of 
Dominicans, past and present, who have served you here? Maybe you or your children attended St. 
Dominic School or St. Rose Academy, or were baptized or married here. Maybe you were inspired 
by the church‘s soaring Gothic beauty, or made lasting friendships through our peer community 
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when one donates to the school of one‘s child.221 The parent-donor‘s utility 
function is likely to be extremely interdependent with that of her child,
222
 
and will likely be somewhat interdependent with her child‘s classmates and 
their families.
223
 This suggests that externality problems may be much 
milder in these final two circumstances. Because high-preference 
beneficiaries may internalize a portion of the benefits of non-contributing 
low-preference beneficiaries, any underfunding gap may be drastically 
reduced. Still, one might argue that these donors will not fully internalize 
relevant benefits so that some underfunding problems may persist.  
 A more sophisticated analysis suggests the underfunding problem may 
be even more slight than this simple analysis suggests. Those donating to 
specific churches and schools will generally be the same individuals that 
benefit from these organizations.
224
 Further, each member of this 
donor/beneficiary pool is likely to share ongoing relationships with at least 
some other members of the pool. As a result, each donor will likely 
internalize some of the benefits enjoyed by the other beneficiaries.
225
 This 
may cause high-preference beneficiaries to donate the amount (or 
something close to the amount) needed to optimally fund goods and 
services even if low-preference beneficiaries completely fail to contribute.  
This possible ―compounding effect‖226 can be illustrated with a final, 
                                                                                                                     
groups or our many volunteer ministries.‖ (emphasis added)). 
 221. As noted above, the analysis is a bit more nuanced in this case because most of the benefit 
experienced by the parent-donor is the internalized benefit of her child. In this way, it may be more 
accurate to characterize the internalized benefit of the parent-child as a quasi-direct benefit, which 
results in the presence of a high-preference donor group, see supra note 162, and to only focus on 
the benefits of other students and their families in analyzing internalized benefits and the externality 
problem. This more detailed analysis seems unnecessary to make the general point that the school 
donation seems roughly analogous to the church donation. This Author recognizes, however, the 
additional nuances presented by the school donation.  
 222. Bergstrom, supra note 98, at 76. She might, therefore, internalize a substantial portion of 
the benefits of his being better educated, the benefits of his being able to enjoy improved or 
additional facilities, and the ―solidarity benefits‖ her child might experience by being able to 
associate with classmates who are also able to enjoy these things. See id. 
 223. See supra note 147 and accompanying text (discussing shared interests among neighbors). 
 224. See supra Part V.A.1.  
 225. Effects similar to these are often referred to as ―two-sided‖ altruism. Economists have 
tended to focus on the case of intergenerational transfers. See, e.g., Miles S. Kimball, Making Sense 
of Two-Sided Altruism, 20 J. MONETARY ECON. 301, 301 (1987) (analyzing generational altruism). 
See generally Lakshmi K. Raut, Two-Sided Altruism, Lindahl Equilibrium, and Pareto Optimality 
in Overlapping Generations Models, 27 ECON. THEORY 729 (2006) (also analyzing generational 
altruism).  
 226. Cf. Kimball, supra note 225, at 304 & n.4 (describing the ―Hall of Mirrors‖ effect from 
attempting to calculate parents‘ and their children‘s concern for one another, which also is a 
function of how each cares for the other, thus resulting in a compounding effect); cf. also 
Bergstrom, supra note 98, at 76 (―[I]ntrafamilial utility interdependence often has an interesting 
special structure. For example . . . parents care about the happiness of their children and children 
care about the happiness of their parents.‖). Professor Theodore Bergstrom notes that this effect also 
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(over)simplified numerical example.
227
 Suppose it would cost a church 
$900 to provide one religious service, $600 to provide the second, and 
$100 to provide the third. Assume a low-preference group would enjoy an 
aggregate direct benefit of $200 from the first service, an aggregate $150 
direct benefit from the second, and an aggregate $50 direct benefit from the 
third. Next, assume ten high-preference individuals would together enjoy 
direct benefits of $750 from the first service, $500 from the second, and 
$70 from the third. The optimal subsidization level is to provide three 
services. For reasons discussed in Part V.A.1, the high-preference group 
may donate a large percentage of needed costs, or the $1,320 equal to their 
total direct benefit. However, while this covers a large portion of the 
$1,600 cost, an additional $280 is needed to fund the optimal three 
services.
228
  
If each of the ten high-preference individuals internalized just one-
fiftieth of the other churchgoers‘ benefits, each high-preference individual 
would contribute an additional $32,
229
 which would allow the church to 
collect the needed $280. Because each member of the high-preference 
group internalized this rather slight fraction of the others‘ benefits, a 
―compounding effect‖ occurred which allowed the donee-organization to 
collect the donations needed for optimal provision. This is not meant to 
suggest that underfunding will be perfectly eliminated in the neat way 
provided by this numerical example. It does, however, suggest another 
possible reason to believe that churches may suffer only minimal 
underfunding problems.  
A similar analysis likely applies to donations made to specific schools. 
As discussed, it seems likely that parents will form a high-preference group 
that contributes a bulk of the cost needed to optimally fund the schools of 
their own children. Further, donors are likely to internalize a large portion 
of the benefits experienced by their children
230
 and to partially internalize 
the benefits experienced by other children and their families, with whom 
                                                                                                                     
occurs in other contexts, such as ―a population of individuals living along a road, each of whom is 
concerned about his own consumption and that of his neighbors on either side.‖ Id. at 83. 
 227. Though stated earlier, it seems important to remind the reader that numerical examples 
such as these are provided for illustrative purposes only and are in no way meant to imply 
mathematical certitude. See supra Part V. 
 228.  As discussed, there may be substantial ―warm-glow‖ benefits associated with giving, 
particularly to these high-preference individuals who give substantial sums. However, temporarily 
assume that there are no giving benefits in order to isolate the internalized benefits and illustrate the 
compounding effect.  
 229. Total benefits are the $1,320 benefits enjoyed by the high-preference donors plus the 
$400 benefits of low-preference beneficiaries, or $1,720. Each of the ten high-preference 
individuals benefits $132 so the remaining benefits for him to internalize are $1,720–132 = $1,588. 
If each high preference individual internalized one-fiftieth of this, he would donate an additional 
$31.76.  
 230. See Bergstrom, supra note 98, at 76 (discussing intrafamily transfers).  
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the donor is likely acquainted.
231
 Because of this, the compounding effect 
described above may occur and the sum of the partially internalized 
benefits contributed by the high-preference group might fill any 
underfunding gap even if the low-preference group completely fails to 
donate.  
D.  Analytical Synthesis 
Current tax law generally allows donors to deduct amounts contributed 
to each of the hypothetical organizations discussed. However, the analysis 
suggests that the severity of underfunding problems suffered by these 
organizations is likely to vary greatly and that current law may provide 
economically unnecessary subsidies to organizations already providing 
goods and services at optimal (or nearly optimal) levels.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 231. See supra notes 162 and 221 (discussing the possible nuances to this analysis). If one 
were to categorize the internalized benefits of the donor‘s child as quasi-direct benefits (as 
suggested earlier) and to focus only on the benefits of other students and their families in analyzing 
internalized benefits, the compounding effect would occur to the extent that high-preference donors 
internalized a portion of these individuals‘ benefits. This seems likely because of the relationship 
donors likely share with these other beneficiaries.  
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Below is a tabular summary of the analysis:  
 
Organization High-Preference 
Group 
Step/Lumpy 
goods 
Giving Benefits Internalized 
Benefits 
Underfunding 
assessment 
Toy Unlikely N/A 
 
Limited to 
―created‖ warm 
glow 
Little  Likely severe 
Opera Likely  Somewhat but 
limited ability 
to provide 
needed 
information 
Small to 
moderate, 
especially 
reputational 
enhancement  
Little  Likely mild to 
moderate 
Specific 
Church 
Very Likely  Yes, 
especially for 
large projects 
where 
information 
can be 
meaningfully 
communicated 
Possibly 
significant warm 
glow and 
reputational 
enhancement 
because of 
ongoing 
relationships  
Significant, 
possibly 
leading to 
compounding 
effect 
Likely 
minimal  
Specific 
School 
Very Likely  Yes, 
especially for 
large projects 
where 
information 
can be 
meaningfully 
communicated 
Possibly 
significant warm 
glow and 
reputational 
enhancement 
because of 
ongoing 
relationships 
Significant, 
possibly 
leading to 
compounding 
effect 
Likely 
minimal  
Importance 
of benefit 
May reduce 
collective action 
problems  
May 
reduce 
lingering 
collective 
action 
problems when 
high preference 
group exists 
and effective 
communication 
possible  
May allow 
low-preference 
free-riders to 
contribute and 
high-preference 
donors to 
contribute more 
than direct 
benefits  
Assesses 
extent of 
externality 
problem 
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VI.  CONCLUDING REMARKS AND PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS  
The above analysis not only provides useful insights about the specific 
hypothetical donations but can also serve more general purposes. The 
hypothetical donations may be seen as representative of more general 
transfer types that differ with respect to two variables: the benefits the 
donor can be expected to receive as a result of his donation and the 
relationships shared with other beneficiaries. While one would need to 
account for the specific facts and circumstances of each case, the analysis 
acts as a useful starting point for exposing the large range of underfunding 
problems suffered by organizations currently subsidized by the charitable 
deduction.  
As exhibited by the analysis of the ―toy donation,‖ when organizations 
do not provide significant benefits to donors and instead provide goods and 
services to beneficiaries with whom the donor shares little, if any, 
relationship, the charitable deduction is easily justified under efficiency 
analysis because underfunding problems are likely severe. Similar analyses 
would seem to apply to most organizations serving the needy, such as soup 
kitchens and homeless shelters as well as organizations serving non-
humans such as those focused on animal cruelty or widespread 
environmental pollution.  
As exhibited by the ―opera donation,‖ when organizations provide 
significant direct benefits to high-preference donors but also provide goods 
and services to other beneficiaries with whom the donor shares little, if any 
ongoing relationship, underfunding problems are likely to be moderate or 
mild. While some donors will experience large direct benefits and may 
enjoy some giving benefits, externality problems are still likely to exist. 
Similar analyses likely apply to donations made to other organizations 
promoting the arts such as the ballet, symphony orchestra, and museums.  
The analysis also provides a useful starting point for analyzing 
donations that seem to fall in between these two types, such as donations to 
local blood banks, local medical facilities, and research organizations 
dedicated to the cure of (perhaps rather rare) diseases. While some donors 
may experience direct benefits from these organizations (for example, a 
donor may need a transfusion or be infected with the perhaps rare disease 
upon which the donee-organization is focused), many donors will not do 
so. Further, donors are unlikely to share relationships with other 
beneficiaries so that the externality problem will probably be severe.  
Finally, as exhibited in the ―church‖ and ―school donations,‖ when 
organizations provide significant direct benefits to high-preference donors 
and also provide goods and services to other beneficiaries with whom 
donors share substantial, ongoing relationships, underfunding problems 
may be rather minimal. Put more simply, by allowing donors to deduct 
amounts contributed to organizations that provide benefits remaining ―too 
close to home,‖ the tax law provides subsidies that may be economically 
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unnecessary. Similar analyses may apply to donations made to local parent 
teacher associations, local recreational sports teams, local boy and girl 
scouts troops, and to organizations which maintain neighborhood parks or 
other similar venues.
232
  
This Article will not attempt to craft a final resolution to these exposed 
issues but will offer a non-inclusive list of possible responses. The more 
detailed analysis needed to precisely define the mechanics of these 
responses and to provide a comparison of their merits will be reserved for 
future work.  
The most direct response would require revision of § 170, which 
determines which organizations are entitled to receive subsidies through 
the charitable deduction.
233
 This would require one to determine how 
severe the underfunding problem should be before a deduction is 
warranted. Quite clearly, severely underfunded organizations would retain 
their ability to receive deductible contributions. Whether moderately 
underfunded organizations such as the opera organization should retain 
their subsidy would be a question upon which reasonable minds might 
differ. However, efficiency analysis would suggest that it is economically 
unnecessary to allow donors to deduct amounts contributed to 
organizations such as specific schools and churches
234
 that generally suffer 
minimal underfunding issues. 
Future work is needed to precisely determine how lawmakers might 
modify § 170 to reflect this analysis. Without opining on specifics, this 
Author suggests that even a modest modification would be helpful. For 
                                                                                                                     
 232. The IRS allows deductions for some charitable organizations in each of these types of 
organizations. Search for Charities, Online Version of Publication 78, supra note 1 (search, for 
example, ―parent teacher,‖ ―baseball,‖ ―boy scouts,‖ or ―playground‖). For recreational teams, 
however, taxpayers may not deduct amounts that constitute ―membership fees‖ or other expenses to 
allow their child to take part in these recreational activities. IRS, DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, 
PUBLICATION 526, CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS 4 (2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p526.pdf. 
 233. See generally Gergen, supra note 12 (suggesting a major overhaul of the charitable 
deduction framework).  
 234. Additional work is needed to reflect the fact that churches use donations both for religious 
and non-religious purposes. See supra note 129 (recognizing this dual use of funds and explaining 
why the analysis remains significant). As discussed, this Article focuses upon donations used to 
finance religious functions and is not meant to apply to donations used to finance other charitable 
functions. However, this Article has suggested that, under efficiency criteria, church donations used 
to fund religious functions should not be deductible because underfunding will be slight—i.e., one 
can generally expect these services to be optimally, or close to optimally, provided. Various 
mechanisms could be devised to preserve deductions for donations used for other charitable 
functions. For instance, churches could establish separate entities under § 501(c)(3) to perform 
these non-religious functions. Further, donors could designate the purposes to which their funds are 
to be used, or they could be allowed to deduct a percentage of their contributions equal to the 
percentage of total donations used by the church for non-religious, charitable activities. Because 
this Article‘s main aim is to provide an analysis of underfunding issues, however, working out the 
precise details of this solution extends beyond the scope of this Article.   
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instance, while donors might not be able to deduct amounts contributed to 
specific schools, they might be able to deduct amounts donated to 
organizations that funded schools of a designated town or county. 
Similarly, while donors might not be able to deduct amounts contributed to 
specific churches, they might be able to deduct amounts donated to fund 
same-denominational churches of a designated locality.  
Keeping the proposal sufficiently modest would respond to an 
anticipated objection to this Article‘s admittedly generalized analysis. 
While the analysis suggests that organizations such as specific churches 
and schools will often be optimally, or nearly optimally, funded in the 
absence of the charitable deduction, this will certainly not be true in all 
cases. For instance, while many churches might thrive on the contributions 
of high-preference donors, some may struggle because their congregants, 
while possessing similarly strong preferences, lack the financial ability to 
donate accordingly. Similarly, while some schools might receive ample 
donations from the financially capable parents of attending students, other 
schools may be underfunded because they serve communities that value 
education highly but that cannot afford to donate in a way reflective of this 
preference.
235
 A modest modification such as that described may achieve a 
desirable balance. On one hand, it would create some separation between 
donee-organizations and the beneficiaries of their donations, increasing the 
likelihood that the charitable deduction was addressing some level of 
underfunding. On the other hand, the modification would reflect the 
economic reality that not all ―close to home‖ organizations are optimally 
funded and might enable a more even allocation of resources among 
organizations serving similar purposes but suffering from a range of 
underfunding issues caused by wealth disparities.
236
  
                                                                                                                     
 235.  This issue is one that is often reported. Consider, for instance, a recently reported problem 
faced by the township of Albany, California. Two of its schools are extremely well-funded by the 
donations and efforts of the students‘ relatively wealthy parents, providing students with ―parent-
funded academic extras like chess, art and music class.‖ Jill Tucker, Albany Schools Try to Balance 
Parent-Funded Extras, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 27, 2010, http://articles.sfgate.com/2010-11-
27/news/24948346_1_public-schools-foreign-language-programs-public-education. Meanwhile, 
students of Albany‘s ―less affluent sister school[] went without‖ because of inadequate funding. Id. 
A modest change in the law allowing donors to deduct amounts contributed to the town‘s education 
fund rather than individual schools might help address this disparity. As reported, ―Parent 
contributions in some districts tip the scales even more, raising hundreds if not thousands of dollars 
extra for each child. That means some students get library books and librarians, art, music and 
technological gizmos, while the less affluent may go without enough paper and pencils.‖ Id.  
 236. This Article, of course, does not seek to make a definitive claim as to whether this would 
be the final effect, as this would require careful econometric analysis. Such analysis must be 
reserved for future work. It also should be noted that even this modest proposal might be 
controversial and politically difficult to achieve. The charitable deduction has become rather 
sacrosanct, with many citizens believing that they are entitled to receive tax benefits when they 
donate to the organizations they support. REICH ET AL., supra note 49, at 3 (―[W]hen people form 
associations today, they tend to expect not merely the liberty to associate but also a raft of special 
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Lawmakers might also respond to this Article‘s analysis by altering the 
so-called limitation amounts, which prevent a taxpayer from deducting 
amounts exceeding a provided ceiling.
237
 For instance, current tax law 
allows a taxpayer to claim a charitable deduction for cash donations made 
to religious,
238
 educational,
239
 and charitable organizations
240
 so long as 
that donation does not exceed 50% of her taxable income.
241
 Thus, a 
hypothetical donor having taxable income of $100,000 may generally 
claim a charitable deduction for cash donations made to these 
organizations for amounts up to $50,000. This limitation applies regardless 
of whether the donor contributes to an organization serving the needy in a 
remote location or to the local church where she regularly attends services 
and events. The law might vary limitation amounts depending on the 
relative severity of underfunding issues suffered by recipient organizations. 
For instance, the limitation on donations made to severely underfunded 
organizations like the toy organization could be extremely large (perhaps 
even exceeding the current 50% threshold) while the limitation on 
donations made to ―close to home‖ organizations like specific churches 
and schools could be rather slight.
 
 
Finally, some may point out that not all taxpayers who donate to ―close 
to home‖ organizations will have the close ties described in this Article. 
One may therefore suggest that the law disallow deductions for those 
                                                                                                                     
tax benefits for their associations. Specifically, they seek to obtain formal recognition from the 
federal government as nonprofit organizations, a status which entitles organizations, and often their 
donors, to tax exemptions.‖). 
 237.  It would be interesting to explore whether this might be a more subtle and, therefore, less 
politically controversial way of responding to the issue. However, this Article will not opine on the 
desirability of utilizing less politically salient methods. For a discussion on political salience and 
taxes, see Brian Galle, Hidden Taxes, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 59 (2009) (exploring the public policy 
behind taxes that are easy or difficult for taxpayers to notice and process) and Deborah H. Schenk, 
Exploiting the Salience Bias in Designing Taxes, 28 YALE J. ON REG. (forthcoming 2011). 
 238. Section 170(b)(1)(A) states that a taxpayer may deduct charitable donations to ―a 
church . . . or association of churches‖ so long as the donations do not exceed 50% of her taxable 
income for the year. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A) (West 2010).  
 239. Id. (including within the 50% contribution cap those donations to ―an educational 
organization which normally maintains a regular faculty and curriculum and normally has a 
regularly enrolled body of pupils or students in attendance at the place where its educational 
activities are regularly carried on‖). 
 240. IRS, supra note 232, at 14 n.6 (listing as an organization subject to the 50% contribution 
cap: ―Corporations, trusts, or community chests, funds, or foundations organized and operated only 
for charitable, religious, educational, scientific, or literary purposes, or to prevent cruelty to children 
or animals, or to foster certain national or international amateur sports competition‖ and adding that 
these organizations ―must be ‗publicly supported,‘ which means they normally must receive a 
substantial part of their support, other than income from their exempt activities, from direct or 
indirect contributions from the general public or from governmental units‖).  
 241.  See supra notes 238–40. Other limits apply to other types of donations, which could be as 
low as 30% or 20% depending on the asset donated and the recipient charity. See, e.g., I.R.C. 
§ 170(b)(1)(B), (D).  
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donors having sufficiently close connections with donee-organizations or 
their beneficiaries while allowing deductions for those lacking these ties. 
For instance, one might suggest expanding the current ―quid pro quo‖ 
requirement, which requires a donor to reduce his charitable deduction if 
he receives certain benefits from the donee-organization.
242
 Generally, the 
quid pro quo limitation applies only to tangible benefits, such as money or 
property given directly to the donor. Thus, if a donor contributed to his 
favorite charity in return for a concert ticket worth $100, the taxpayer 
would be required to reduce the amount of his deduction by that amount.
243
 
However, the quid pro quo limitation does not generally require taxpayers 
to reduce their deductions by less tangible benefits such as those described 
in this Article.
244
 One might propose an expansion to this quid pro quo 
limitation to reduce or deny deductions to high-preference donors (such as 
those donating to their child‘s school or to the church where they regularly 
attend services) while allowing other donors who have no connection to 
the donee-organization or its beneficiaries to retain their tax break. This 
would certainly be a step in the right direction. It does, however, seem a 
rather indirect (and possibly insufficient) response to the issues exposed in 
this Article.
245
  
Certain organizations currently able to receive deductible contributions 
are unlikely to suffer underfunding problems even in the absence of the 
deduction. Allowing any taxpayer to deduct amounts donated to these 
organizations would result in the subsidization of organizations that are 
generally able to provide goods and services optimally. It, therefore, seems 
more appropriate to focus on the donor-organization in crafting a response 
to the issues identified in this Article and to limit the organizations 
subsidized through the charitable deduction to those in economic need. 
                                                                                                                     
 242. IRS rules limit the amount of one‘s charitable deduction to ―the excess of the payment to 
the charity over the value of any benefit . . . received by the donor.‖ WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., 
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 372 (14th ed. 2006); see also Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104 
(1967) (―[T]he full fair market value of the admission and other benefits or privileges must be taken 
into account.‖). Fair market value must be included regardless of whether the taxpayer subjectively 
values it at this figure. See Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off: When and About What, 84 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 913, 919 (2009).  
 243. Substantiating Charitable Contributions, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/charities/article/0,,id= 
96102,00.html (last updated June 29, 2010).  
 244. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 690 (1989) (―The legislative history 
of the ‗contribution or gift‘ limitation, though sparse, reveals that Congress intended to differentiate 
between unrequited payments to qualified recipients and payments made to such recipients in return 
for goods or services. Only the former were deemed deductible.‖); see also Colombo, supra note 
28, at 662–67 (providing a summary of the current interpretation of the quid pro quo limitation).  
 245. This is not to imply that there are not circumstances in which an expansion of the quid pro 
quo requirement would be appropriate. For an excellent discussion of this issue, see generally 
Colombo, supra note 28 (analyzing the utility in expanding the definition of quid pro quo 
transactions). 
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